HighGHSA-2j4c-ffch-9f23CVE-2026-107214GO-2026-6684

Excelize Decrypt: unrecoverable panics on malformed OLE/CFB encrypted workbooks

Published 8 Oct 2026 · Updated 19 Oct 2026

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Affected package

Affected
>=2.3.1 <2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94
Fixed in
2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:go get github.com/xuri/excelize/v2@v2.11.1-0.20260915055537-22f76f9acb94

Details

Summary

Any file whose first 8 bytes are the OLE compound-file signature (D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1) is routed by OpenFile/OpenReader/OpenBytes → openReaderAt → Decrypt. The version dispatch only guarantees len(EncryptionInfo) >= 4 before handing attacker-controlled EncryptionInfo/EncryptedPackage buffers to standardDecrypt/agileDecrypt, and no callee validates structure. Malformed but version-valid content therefore fails as an unrecovered runtime panic instead of an error, terminating the calling process.

Details

All panic classes below were execution-confirmed against pristine master (ecd99d761fe0, 2026-09-08). excelize.go:211-213 maps Decrypt *errors* to ErrWorkbookFileFormat, but panics bypass that path and kill the process.

| # | Malformed input | Panic | Site | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | standard, len(EncryptionInfo) 4–11 | slice bounds [:12] | crypt.go:238 | | 2 | standard, attacker-controlled headerSize uint32 | slice bounds [12:12+headerSize] / fixed-offset header reads | crypt.go:238-249 | | 3 | standard, verifier remainder < 72 (AES) / 60 (RC4) bytes | slice bounds in standardEncryptionVerifier | crypt.go:282-295 | | 4 | standard, header.KeySize = 0xFFFFFFFF | slice bounds [:536870911] with capacity 48 | crypt.go:321 | | 5 | standard, EncryptedPackage stream missing/short | slice bounds [8:0] | crypt.go:268 | | 6 | agile, len(EncryptionInfo) 4–7 | slice bounds [8:4] | crypt.go:407 | | 7 | agile, valid XML without <keyEncryptors> | index out of range [0] with length 0 | crypt.go:416, 433 | | 8 | agile, saltValue decoded length ≠ AES block | cipher.NewCBCDecrypter: IV length must equal block size | crypt.go:425 → 512 | | 9 | any, keyData blockSize="0" | integer divide by zero | crypt.go:539 |

Note the asymmetry pinpointing the missing constraint: the agile path already checks len(EncryptedPackage) >= 8 (crypt.go:520-523) but the standard path does not (#5). Existing tests only cover the error paths (short <4 bytes → ErrUnknownEncryptMechanism, bad XML, base64 errors), never these panic paths.

PoC

Standalone programs (public API only, inputs built in memory) were provided to the maintainer by email: 1-decrypt-panic builds seven malformed CFB containers and shows each panic escaping the public Decrypt API plus one end-to-end OpenReader crash. All cases print PANIC on master and BLOCKED with the proposed patch. A regression guard proves legitimate decryption is unaffected: a workbook encrypted with the package's own Encrypt() still opens through the same code path.

(A separate advisory covers the unbounded/negative allocation in extractPart.)

Impact

Any service that calls OpenFile/OpenReader/OpenBytes on untrusted input (upload processing, mail scanning, spreadsheet conversion) can be killed remotely and without authentication by a file of ~100 bytes to ~3 KB. No password is required — panics occur during structural/parameter handling before successful decryption. Site variety means filtering one pattern does not help.

Proposed fix

A recover() boundary in Decrypt mapping any panic to ErrWorkbookFileFormat (restores the documented error-routing contract; legitimate standard/agile decryption unaffected). A complete patch has been provided to the maintainer; per-site length validation is recommended as defense in depth.

Is GHSA-2j4c-ffch-9f23 in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/xuri/excelize/v2, and gives you the command that fixes it.

More advisories for github.com/xuri/excelize/v2

  • LowCVE-2026-107225Excelize: GetStyle panics on a negative fillId, borderId or fontId in styles.xml in github.com/xuri/excelize · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-107218Excelize: RIGHT() on supplementary-plane text slices with a negative index and panics in github.com/xuri/excelize · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-107221Panic on out-of-order cell column references when reading worksheets in github.com/xuri/excelize · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-107217Integer overflow yields an out-of-domain coordinate with nil error, causing panic in github.com/xuri/excelize · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-107223Unbounded <col max> lacks MaxColumns check in flatCols(), causing column mutators to hang or OOM in github.com/xuri/excelize · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-107224Excelize: A Zip64 uncompressed-size of 2^63 panics OpenFile/OpenReader in github.com/xuri/excelize · 5 Nov 2026
All 35 advisories for github.com/xuri/excelize/v2

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.