HighGHSA-2m67-wjpj-xhg9

Jackson Core: Document length constraint bypass in blocking, async, and DataInput parsers

Published 4 Apr 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026

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Affected package

Affected
>=3.0.0 <3.1.1
Fixed in
3.1.1
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=tools.jackson.core:jackson-core -DdepVersion=3.1.1 -DforceVersion=true

Details

Summary

Jackson Core 3.x does not consistently enforce StreamReadConstraints.maxDocumentLength. Oversized JSON documents can be accepted without a StreamConstraintsException in multiple parser entry points, which allows configured size limits to be bypassed and weakens denial-of-service protections.

Details

Three code paths where maxDocumentLength is not fully enforced:

1. Blocking parsers skip validation of the final in-memory buffer

Blocking parsers validate only previously processed buffers, not the final in-memory buffer:

  • ReaderBasedJsonParser.java:255
  • UTF8StreamJsonParser.java:208

Relevant code:

_currInputProcessed += bufSize;
_streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed);

This means the check occurs only when a completed buffer is rolled over. If an oversized document is fully contained in the final buffer, parsing can complete without any document-length exception.

2. Async parsers skip validation of the final chunk on end-of-input

Async parsers validate previously processed chunks, but do not validate the final chunk on end-of-input:

  • NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser.java:49
  • NonBlockingByteBufferJsonParser.java:57
  • NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase.java:75

Relevant code:

_currInputProcessed += _origBufferLen;
_streamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(_currInputProcessed);

public void endOfInput() {
    _endOfInput = true;
}

endOfInput() marks EOF but does not perform a final validateDocumentLength(...) call, so an oversized last chunk is accepted.

3. DataInput parser path does not enforce maxDocumentLength at all

  • JsonFactory.java:457

Relevant construction path:

int firstByte = ByteSourceJsonBootstrapper.skipUTF8BOM(input);
return new UTF8DataInputJsonParser(readCtxt, ioCtxt,
        readCtxt.getStreamReadFeatures(_streamReadFeatures),
        readCtxt.getFormatReadFeatures(_formatReadFeatures),
        input, can, firstByte);

UTF8DataInputJsonParser does not call StreamReadConstraints.validateDocumentLength(...), so maxDocumentLength is effectively disabled for createParser(..., DataInput) users.

> Note: This issue appears distinct from the recently published nesting-depth and number-length constraint advisories because it affects document-length enforcement.

PoC

Async path reproducer

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import tools.jackson.core.JsonParser;
import tools.jackson.core.ObjectReadContext;
import tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints;
import tools.jackson.core.async.ByteArrayFeeder;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;

public class Poc {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder()
                .streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder()
                        .maxDocumentLength(10L)
                        .build())
                .build();

        byte[] doc = "{\"a\":1,\"b\":2}".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);

        try (JsonParser p = factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty())) {
            ByteArrayFeeder feeder = (ByteArrayFeeder) p.nonBlockingInputFeeder();
            feeder.feedInput(doc, 0, doc.length);
            feeder.endOfInput();

            while (p.nextToken() != null) { }
        }

        System.out.println("Parsed successfully");
    }
}
  • Expected result: Parsing should fail because the configured document-length limit is 10, while the input is longer than 10 bytes.
  • Actual result: The document is accepted and parsing completes.

Blocking path reproducer

import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import tools.jackson.core.JsonParser;
import tools.jackson.core.StreamReadConstraints;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;

public class Poc2 {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        JsonFactory factory = JsonFactory.builder()
                .streamReadConstraints(StreamReadConstraints.builder()
                        .maxDocumentLength(10L)
                        .build())
                .build();

        byte[] doc = "{\"a\":1,\"b\":2}".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);

        try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(new ByteArrayInputStream(doc))) {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) { }
        }

        System.out.println("Parsed successfully");
    }
}

Impact

Applications that rely on maxDocumentLength as a safety control for untrusted JSON can accept oversized inputs without error. In network-facing services this weakens an explicit denial-of-service protection and can increase CPU and memory consumption by allowing larger-than-configured request bodies to be processed.

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More advisories for tools.jackson.core:jackson-core

  • HighCVE-2026-89425jackson-core: UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() missing maxErrorTokenLength limit -> unbounded StringBuilder growth (DoS) · 1 Oct 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-89407 jackson-core: ReDoS: quadratic backtracking in NumberInput.PATTERN_FLOAT via looksLikeValidNumber() · 1 Oct 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-68494jackson-core: Async parser maxNumberLength bypass via chunked digit accumulation (incomplete fix for GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq) · 21 Jul 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-29062jackson-core has Nesting Depth Constraint Bypass in `UTF8DataInputJsonParser` potentially allowing Resource Exhaustion · 4 Mar 2026
  • MediumCVE-2026-18401jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition · 28 Feb 2026
tools.jackson.core:jackson-core security overview

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.