Fiber is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via Flash Cookie Unbounded Allocation
Published 24 Feb 2026 · Updated 27 Feb 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- <3.1.0
- Fixed in
- 3.1.0
go get github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3@v3.1.0Details
Summary
The use of the fiber_flash cookie can force an unbounded allocation on any server. A crafted 10-character cookie value triggers an attempt to allocate up to 85GB of memory via unvalidated msgpack deserialization. No authentication is required. Every GoFiber v3 endpoint is affected regardless of whether the application uses flash messages.
Details
Regardless of configuration, the flash cookie is checked:
func (app *App) requestHandler(rctx *fasthttp.RequestCtx) {
// Acquire context from the pool
ctx := app.AcquireCtx(rctx)
defer app.ReleaseCtx(ctx)
// Optional: Check flash messages
rawHeaders := d.Request().Header.RawHeaders()
if len(rawHeaders) > 0 && bytes.Contains(rawHeaders, flashCookieNameBytes) {
d.Redirect().parseAndClearFlashMessages()
}
_, err = app.next(d)
} else {
// Check if the HTTP method is valid
if ctx.getMethodInt() == -1 {
_ = ctx.SendStatus(StatusNotImplemented) //nolint:errcheck // Always return nil
return
}
// Optional: Check flash messages
rawHeaders := ctx.Request().Header.RawHeaders()
if len(rawHeaders) > 0 && bytes.Contains(rawHeaders, flashCookieNameBytes) {
ctx.Redirect().parseAndClearFlashMessages()
}
}The cookie value is hex-decoded and passed directly to msgpack deserialization with no size or content validation:
https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/f8f34f642fb3682c341ede7816e7cf861aa7df89/redirect.go#L371
// parseAndClearFlashMessages is a method to get flash messages before they are getting removed
func (r *Redirect) parseAndClearFlashMessages() {
// parse flash messages
cookieValue, err := hex.DecodeString(r.c.Cookies(FlashCookieName))
if err != nil {
return
}
_, err = r.c.flashMessages.UnmarshalMsg(cookieValue)
if err != nil {
return
}
r.c.Cookie(&Cookie{
Name: FlashCookieName,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
MaxAge: -1,
})
}The auto-generated tinylib/msgp deserialization reads a uint32 array header from the attacker-controlled byte stream and passes it directly to make() with no bounds check:
https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/f8f34f642fb3682c341ede7816e7cf861aa7df89/redirect_msgp.go#L242
// UnmarshalMsg implements msgp.Unmarshaler
func (z *redirectionMsgs) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
var zb0002 uint32
zb0002, bts, err = msgp.ReadArrayHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return o, err
}
if cap((*z)) >= int(zb0002) {
(*z) = (*z)[:zb0002]
} else {
(*z) = make(redirectionMsgs, zb0002)
}
for zb0001 := range *z {
bts, err = (*z)[zb0001].UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, zb0001)
return o, err
}
}
o = bts
return o, err
}where
zb0002, bts, err = msgp.ReadArrayHeaderBytes(bts) translates the attacker-controlled value into the element count and make(redirectionMsgs, zb0002) performs the unbounded allocation
So we can craft a gofiber cookie that will force a huge allocation:
curl -H "Cookie: fiber_flash=dd7fffffff" http://localhost:5000/hello
The cookie val is a hex-encoded msgpack array32 header:
dd= msgpack array32 marker7fffffff= 2 147 483 647 elements
Impact
Unauthenticated remote Denial of Service (CWE-789). Anyone running a gofiber v3.0.0 or v3 server is affected. The flash cookie parsing is hardcoded.
Is GHSA-2mr3-m5q5-wgp6 in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3
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- LowCVE-2026-44332GoFiber Vulnerable to Username Enumeration via Timing Oracle in BasicAuth Default Authorizer in github.com/gofiber/fiber · 24 Jul 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45045GoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward in github.com/gofiber/fiber · 24 Jul 2026
- LowCVE-2026-53624GoFiber never set HSTS header in helmet middleware due to incorrect protocol check in github.com/gofiber/fiber · 24 Jul 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-45045GoFiber Vulnerable to X-Real-IP Spoofing via Header.Add() in BalancerForward · 2 Jul 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.