Echo's middleware.Static: `%2F`-encoded path bypasses route/group middleware guarding a statically-served path
Published 28 Oct 2026 · Updated 5 Nov 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- <5.4.0
- Fixed in
- 5.4.0
go get github.com/labstack/echo/v5@v5.4.0- Affected
- <4.16.0
- Fixed in
- 4.16.0
go get github.com/labstack/echo/v4@v4.16.0Details
Summary
When middleware.Static is mounted globally (e.Use(middleware.Static(...))) and an application relies on a route- or group-level middleware guard to restrict a path that also falls under the served static root, a %2F-encoded request bypasses that guard while the file is still served. This is the same encoding/decoding mismatch fixed for StaticFS/StaticDirectoryHandler in CVE-2026-55677 / GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq, but the fix did not cover the middleware.Static path. In addition, the StaticConfig.EnablePathUnescaping docstring states the default configuration prevents exactly this bypass, which is inaccurate for the global-mount case.
This is not path traversal: no file outside the static root is accessed. The served file lives inside the static root; the issue is that access-control expectations set by a route guard are inconsistent between the literal and %2F-encoded forms of the same path.
Details
Root cause — the router and the static handler disagree on how to interpret %2F:
- The router matches routes on the raw, still-encoded path, so
GET /admin%2Fsecret.txtdoes not match a/admin/...route or group; any middleware attached to that route/group is therefore skipped. middleware.Staticselects its path source inmiddleware/static.go(~L219): with a globale.Usemount there is no wildcard route, so it usesc.Request().URL.Path, whichnet/httphas already decoded (%2F→/). It thenpath.Cleans (~L235) andOpens (~L259)admin/secret.txt, serving the file.
Net effect: for the literal path the guard runs; for the %2F-encoded path the guard is skipped but the same file is served.
Relevant code:
middleware/static.go~L219 (p := c.Request().URL.Path), ~L235 (path.Clean), ~L259 (currentFS.Open)StaticConfig.EnablePathUnescapingdocstring (static.go~L60-67) — claims the default prevents the/admin%2fprivate.txt→/admin/*guard bypass; this is not true for the global mount.
Relationship to prior advisories:
- CVE-2026-55677 / GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq (patched 5.2.0): same
%2Frouter-vs-handler mismatch, but fixed forStaticFS/StaticDirectoryHandler. Themiddleware.Staticpath was not covered — this report is that gap. - CVE-2026-25766 / GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9 (patched 5.0.3): a *different* issue (Windows backslash traversal outside the root). Referenced only to disambiguate; not the same as this report.
PoC
Environment: golang:1.25, module using the official release (go get github.com/labstack/echo/v5@v5.3.1, no local replace). Static root public/ contains a marker file public/admin/secret.txt = SECRET.
Minimal app (the pattern under test: static served globally + a group guard intended to protect /admin):
package main
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
e := echo.New()
e.Use(middleware.Static("public")) // serves ./public globally (default filesystem)
admin := e.Group("/admin", func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *echo.Context) error { return c.String(http.StatusUnauthorized, "auth required") }
})
admin.GET("/secret.txt", func(c *echo.Context) error { return c.String(http.StatusOK, "handler") })
e.Start(":1323")
}Requests (unauthenticated):
# Literal: route matches -> group guard runs curl -i http://localhost:1323/admin/secret.txt # => 401 # %2F-encoded: route does NOT match -> guard skipped, but middleware.Static serves the file curl -i --path-as-is http://localhost:1323/admin%2Fsecret.txt # => 200, body: SECRET
Observed on v5.3.1: literal → 401; %2F → 200 with the file contents. For contrast, serving via the (patched) e.StaticFS("/") returns 404 for the same %2F request, showing the middleware.Static path was not covered by the CVE-2026-55677 fix.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote user can retrieve a file served by middleware.Static even when the application attached a route/group middleware guard to that path, by substituting / with %2F. The consequence is limited to files already inside the served static root (CWE-863 authorization inconsistency; CWE-436 interpretation conflict) — there is no access to files outside the static root.
Honest caveat on validity / severity: this only has security impact for applications that (a) serve a directory statically to the public *and* (b) place a sensitive file inside that same directory while relying on a *route-level* guard to protect it. That combination is arguably a misconfiguration — a statically-served directory is public by design — so maintainers may reasonably classify this as a documentation fix (correct the EnablePathUnescaping claim) or won't-fix rather than a code vulnerability. It is filed primarily because (1) the router-vs-handler %2F inconsistency is the exact class fixed in CVE-2026-55677 but left uncovered for middleware.Static, and (2) the docstring currently promises protection it does not provide.
Patches
Fixed in github.com/labstack/echo/v5 v5.4.0 and github.com/labstack/echo/v4 v4.16.0. With the default settings, the Static middleware resolves files from the same form of the path that the router matched, so percent-encoded paths such as /admin%2Fsecret.txt or /%61dmin/secret.txt no longer reach a file under a guarded route. Paths with ., .. or empty segments are no longer served.
Note: middleware registered with Echo#Use runs before route and group middleware, so route guards never protect files served by a global Static middleware. Keep protected files outside its root directory, or serve them with Echo#Static behind the guard.
Workarounds
Keep files that need protection outside the Static middleware's root directory.
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- LowCVE-2026-118652Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via unsanitized JSONP callback in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118266Echo has CSRF Protection Bypass via MethodOverride Rewriting POST to Safe Method in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118658Arbitrary Scheme Injection in WWWRedirect/NonWWWRedirect Middlewares via X-Forwarded-Proto in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118657Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2eade87ae7e5a09d7bb5087bec271ec1
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b2f3415cf2bf5204082137b205bfd5af
- Packagegithub.com/labstack/echo
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0
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