Evmos transaction execution not accounting for all state transition after interaction with precompiles
Published 10 Apr 2024 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- <17.0.0
- Fixed in
- 17.0.0
go get github.com/evmos/evmos/v16@v17.0.0- Affected
- <=7.0.0
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=6.0.4
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=5.0.0
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=1.1.3
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=2.0.2
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=3.0.3
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=4.0.2
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=5.0.1
- Fixed in
- No fix released
Details
Context
- `stateObject`: represents the state of an account and is used to store its updates during a state transition. This is accomplished using two in memory Storage variables:
originStorageanddirtyStorage - `StateDB`: it is the general interface to retrieve accounts and holds a map of stateObjects.
Impact
An external contributor, @iczc, discovered a way to mint arbitrary tokens due to the possibility to have two different states not in sync during the execution of a transaction. The exploit is based on the fact that to sync the Cosmos SDK state and the EVM one, we rely on the stateDB.Commit() method. When we call this method, we iterate though all the dirtyStorage and, if and only if it is different than the originStorage, we set the new state. Setting the new state means we update the Cosmos SDK KVStore.
Below, are described the steps to perform the attack:
- User send a tx to a smart contract (SC) that is calling a precompile.
- The SC perform a state transition of its state from A to B.
- The SC call the precompile.
- The SC perform a state transition of its state from B to A (revert of the previous).
- Once the transaction is executed, and the final Commit is performed, the state A will not be committed to the store because A is the same as
originStorage.
If the tx is executed correctly, this is what happens at the store level:
- Initial state A is loaded from the KVStore and the dirtyStorage is set to B.
- Before running the precompile, the
dirtyStorageis committed to the KVStore without changing theoriginStorage. - Now, since we have a
dirtyStorage, it is updated to the previous value A without changing theoriginStorage.
Since the tx executed correctly, the evm calls the commit to persist the dirtyStorage. However, since dirtyStorage is equal to originStorage, nothing will be changed.
To summarize, if a contract storage state that is the same before and after a transaction, but is changed during the transaction and can call an external contract after the change, it can be exploited to make the transaction similar to non-atomic. The vulnerability is critical since this could lead to drain of funds through creative SC interactions.
Severity
Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions >=V17.0.0.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Reach out to the Core Team in Discord Open a discussion in evmos/evmos Email us at [security@evmos.org](mailto:security@evmos.org) for security questions
Is GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6 in any of your client repos?
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More advisories for github.com/evmos/evmos/v16
- LowCVE-2024-39696Evmos vulnerable to exploit of smart contract account and vesting in github.com/evmos/evmos · 9 Jul 2024
- LowCVE-2024-32873Evmos is missing precompile checks in github.com/evmos/evmos · 28 Jun 2024
- LowCVE-2024-32873Evmos is missing create validator check in github.com/evmos/evmos · 28 Jun 2024
- LowCVE-2024-32873evmos allows transferring unvested tokens after delegations in github.com/evmos/evmos · 14 Jun 2024
- LowCVE-2024-37153Contract balance not updating correctly after interchain transaction in github.com/evmos/evmos · 14 Jun 2024
- LowCVE-2024-37154Evmos allows unvested token delegations in github.com/evmos/evmos · 14 Jun 2024
References
- Linkgithub.com/evmos/evmos/security/advisories/GHSA-3fp5-2xwh-fxm6
- Advisorynvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32644
- Linkgithub.com/evmos/evmos/commit/08982b5ee726b97bc50eaf58d1914829648b6a5f
- Packagegithub.com/evmos/evmos
- Linkgithub.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/state_object.go#L53-L68
- Linkgithub.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/statedb.go#L33-L55
- Linkgithub.com/evmos/evmos/blob/b196a522ba4951890b40992e9f97aa610f8b5f9c/x/evm/statedb/statedb.go#L460-L465
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