MediumGHSA-3h95-x772-4765CVE-2026-129224

NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in CCG lexicon parser causes denial of service via deeply nested category input

Published 19 Nov 2026 · Updated 20 Nov 2026

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Affected package

nltkPyPI
Affected
<3.10.4
Fixed in
3.10.4
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:pip install 'nltk>=3.10.4'

Details

Root Cause

The CCG lexicon parser recurses on nested parenthesised categories without any depth bound. matchBrackets (nltk/ccg/lexicon.py:154) calls itself once per nested (, and augParseCategory (nltk/ccg/lexicon.py:228,242) recurses once per bracketed sub-category. Neither function tracks recursion depth nor checks sys.getrecursionlimit(), and the public entry point fromstring (nltk/ccg/lexicon.py:252, also re-exported via nltk.ccg.chart.fromstring) applies no length or nesting cap before handing the text to the parser.

Impact

An application that parses an untrusted lexicon string aborts with an unhandled RecursionError, terminating the affected parse operation or request worker (denial of service, CWE-674). The recursion is pure Python, so CPython raises a catchable RecursionError rather than crashing the process; there is no memory-corruption or code-execution primitive. Confidentiality and integrity are unaffected. Plausibly, a service that does not wrap the parse in a handler will surface the error to the caller and drop the in-flight request.

Attack Chain

1. The application calls nltk.ccg.lexicon.fromstring(lex_str) with attacker-supplied text such as ":- S\nw => " + "(" * 2000 + "S" + ")" * 2000 + "\n". 2. fromstring splits the input into lines; LEX_RE/RHS_RE (nltk/ccg/lexicon.py:275-276) match and route the parenthesised category into augParseCategory (nltk/ccg/lexicon.py:277) with no depth or length guard. 3. Because the category starts with (, nextCategory dispatches to matchBrackets, which recurses once per nested (; augParseCategory recurses once per bracketed sub-category. Each nesting level consumes call-stack frames. 4. Once the depth exceeds the interpreter recursion limit, an unhandled RecursionError propagates out of the public API and aborts the parse.

Bypass Evidence

Running the dependency-free matchBrackets body verbatim from the shipped source at the default recursion limit (1000): a well-formed balanced input at depth 5 and 500 parses cleanly, while depth 2000 and 5000 raise an unhandled RecursionError. Because shallow, balanced input parses without error, the failure is depth-driven rather than a generic parse error. The crash triggers near ~1000 nesting levels at the default limit, so the payload need not be extreme. A repository-wide search confirms no depth/recursion guard exists anywhere under nltk/ccg/ (the only recent change to this file routed regexes through nltk.redos and added no recursion bound).

Suggested Fix

Add a recursion-depth choke point on the lexicon-parsing path — for example a depth counter that raises a bounded ValueError past a configurable maximum, mirroring the existing guards on FeatStructReader (nltk/featstruct.py), Tree.fromstring (MAX_TREE_DEPTH, nltk/tree/tree.py), and LogicParser (MAX_PARSE_DEPTH, nltk/sem/logic.py).

Reported by pi (GitHub: @manus-pi).

Fix status (2026-09-28)

Status: MERGED on develop (unreleased; v3.10.3 of 2026-08-12 predates the fix).

PR: #3885 "Bound recursion depth in parsers and traversal helpers" (ekaf), merged 2026-09-11, merge commit e521ecafc on develop.

Fix commit: 30e93eb7b (nltk/ccg/lexicon.py: matchBrackets and the category parser stop at MAX_PARSE_DEPTH=500 with ValueError).

Probe: nltk/test/unit/security_probes/ghsa_3h95_x772_4765.py (added in 2a6704952 on that PR); verdict on develop 2fa3f48fe: FIXED (bounded (ValueError)).

Release: none yet; no release tag contains e521ecafc.

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References

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