MediumGHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vhCVE-2026-6790

Eclipse Jetty: HTTP Authority/Host mismatch

Published 22 Jul 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026

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Affected packages

Affected
>=9.4.0.v20161208 <=9.4.58.v20250814
Fixed in
No fix released
Affected
>=10.0.0 <=10.0.26
Fixed in
No fix released
Affected
>=11.0.0 <=11.0.26
Fixed in
No fix released
Affected
>=12.0.0 <12.0.35
Fixed in
12.0.35
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server -DdepVersion=12.0.35 -DforceVersion=true
Affected
>=12.1.0 <12.1.9
Fixed in
12.1.9
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server -DdepVersion=12.1.9 -DforceVersion=true

Details

Summary

Jetty currently accepts HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests where the regular Host header and the pseudo-header :authority do not match. As a result, the same request can carry two different host identities through Jetty:

  • logic based on HttpURI / Request.getServerName(request) uses :authority
  • logic based on raw request headers continues to use Host

This creates a host/authority confusion condition that can break security assumptions in higher layers.

Jetty already performs an explicit authority/Host consistency check on the HTTP/1.1 path, but equivalent validation is missing on the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 paths.

Security Impact

This issue is not inherently remote code execution, but it can become security-relevant in deployments that rely on the request host for security-sensitive decisions, including:

  • host-based access control
  • virtual host isolation
  • multi-tenant routing by hostname
  • login/logout/callback URL construction
  • reverse proxy and forwarded-header trust chains
  • auditing, cache keys, and absolute URL generation

Potential consequences include:

  • bypass of host-based ACLs
  • virtual host or tenant isolation failures
  • incorrect or attacker-influenced redirect/callback targets
  • inconsistent proxy/downstream interpretation of the original target host
  • misleading logs and audit records

Technical Root Cause

1. On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 metadata builder paths:

  • :authority is parsed separately into authority/URI state
  • Host is preserved as a normal request header
  • the two values are not compared for consistency

2. On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 server entry paths:

  • Jetty calls ComplianceUtils.verify(httpCompliance, requestMetaData, listener)
  • this verification does not enforce MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY

3. On the HTTP/1.1 path:

  • Jetty explicitly checks whether authority and Host match
  • mismatches are rejected by default

Relevant Code Locations

HTTP/2 metadata builder:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-hpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/hpack/internal/MetaDataBuilder.java

HTTP/3 metadata builder:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-qpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/qpack/internal/metadata/MetaDataBuilder.java

HTTP/2 server entry:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP2.java

HTTP/3 server entry:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP3.java

Shared HTTP compliance verification:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/ComplianceUtils.java

HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:

  • jetty-core/jetty-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/server/internal/HttpConnection.java

Defined but not enforced on H2/H3:

  • jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/HttpCompliance.java
  • violation: MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY

Reproduction

I reproduced this on local Jetty 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT source.

Minimal reproduction steps:

1. Start a Jetty HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 test server. 2. Send a request with:

  • :authority = localhost:<port>
  • Host = evil.example:<port>

3. In the request handler, inspect both:

  • Request.getServerName(request)
  • request.getHeaders().get(HttpHeader.HOST)

4. Observe whether Jetty rejects the request or allows both values to remain visible. Observed result:

  • HTTP/2: request is accepted and returns 200
  • HTTP/3: request is accepted and returns 200
  • the server can observe both:
  • serverName=localhost
  • hostHeader=evil.example:<port>

This shows that a single attacker-controlled request can preserve two conflicting host interpretations inside Jetty.

Tests Used

HTTP/2 rejection test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority

HTTP/2 exploitability test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader

HTTP/3 rejection test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority

HTTP/3 exploitability test:

  • org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader

Observed behavior:

  • both rejection tests fail because Jetty returns 200 instead of 400
  • both exploitability tests pass, confirming that Jetty exposes different host values to different layers

Project-Internal Evidence of Real Impact

Examples:

  • jetty-openid uses Request.getServerName(request) to construct redirect URLs
  • jetty-ee11-proxy uses the raw Host header when building Forwarded

This indicates that the issue is not merely theoretical: Jetty’s own ecosystem already contains code paths where different host sources are used for different purposes.

Affected Version

Confirmed affected version:

  • 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT

Other versions may also be affected if they share the same HTTP/2 / HTTP/3 request construction and compliance-validation logic. I have not yet completed a historical version matrix and would recommend confirming exact affected ranges from Jetty’s branch history.

Suggested Fix

Recommend adding HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 validation equivalent to the existing HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:

  • if both :authority and regular Host are present
  • normalize and compare them
  • if they do not match, reject the request with 400 Bad Request
  • route the failure through the existing MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY compliance mechanism

Also adding explicit HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 regression coverage for this case.

Disclosure Status

  • not publicly disclosed
  • no public issue filed
  • shared only privately with the Jetty security contacts

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References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.