HighGHSA-82w8-qh3p-5jfqCVE-2026-54283PYSEC-2026-249

Starlette: request.form() limits silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded enable DoS

Published 15 Jun 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026

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Affected package

Affected
>=0.4.1 <1.3.1
Fixed in
1.3.1
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:pip install 'starlette>=1.3.1'

Details

Summary

request.form() accepts max_fields and max_part_size to bound resource consumption while parsing form data. These limits are enforced for multipart/form-data, but silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore send a urlencoded body with an arbitrarily large number of fields or an arbitrarily large field, even when the application configured limits it believed would apply.

Details

request.form() dispatches to a different parser depending on the Content-Type. For multipart/form-data the max_files, max_fields, and max_part_size limits are forwarded to the parser, but for application/x-www-form-urlencoded the parser is constructed without them. It has no max_fields or max_part_size parameter to receive them, and it appends every field with no count check and accumulates each field's name and value with no size check. The configured limits are therefore both unreachable and unenforced for url-encoded bodies.

Because the url-encoded parser does its work synchronously between stream reads, the two attack shapes have different effects:

  • Field count drives CPU and event-loop blocking. A body of ~1,000,000 fields (a sub-10MB payload such as f0=v&f1=v&...) blocks the worker's event loop for several seconds while parsing, during which the worker serves no other request.
  • Field size drives memory. A single large field value (e.g. a 50MB value) is buffered in full to build the FormData, forcing memory allocation proportional to the request body.

The equivalent multipart/form-data request is correctly rejected with 400 Too many fields / 400 Field exceeded maximum size.

Impact

This Denial of service (DoS) vulnerability affects all applications built with Starlette (or FastAPI) that call request.form() on application/x-www-form-urlencoded requests. A single request with a very large number of fields blocks the event loop for several seconds, and a single request with a very large field forces unbounded memory allocation; in either case, parallel requests can render the service unusable. A reverse proxy that enforces a request body size limit reduces but does not eliminate the exposure, since a sub-10MB body is already enough to block the event loop.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a patched version, which forwards max_fields and max_part_size to the url-encoded parser and enforces them while parsing, raising before the oversized field or excess fields are accumulated. The defaults match multipart/form-data (max_fields=1000, max_part_size=1MB) and can be customized via request.form(max_fields=..., max_part_size=...).

Is GHSA-82w8-qh3p-5jfq in any of your client repos?

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All 10 advisories for starlette

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.