ApostropheCMS: Incomplete CVE-2026-53606: `meta http-equiv=refresh` `content` still ships `javascript:` / `data:` URLs
Published 20 Oct 2026 · Updated 20 Oct 2026
Affected package
- Affected
- <2.18.0
- Fixed in
- 2.18.0
npm install sanitize-html@2.18.0Details
Summary
CVE-2026-53606 expanded allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes so named URL attributes (action, formaction, data, poster, background, later ping, xlink:href, …) go through naughtyHref(). A URL nested inside meta content (http-equiv=refresh) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked.
Default allowedTags still omit meta. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow meta plus http-equiv / content.
On 2.17.7:
sanitizeHtml(
'<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:alert(1)">',
{ allowedTags: ['meta'], allowedAttributes: { meta: ['http-equiv', 'content'] } }
)
// => <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:alert(1)" />data:text/html,… and arbitrary https: destinations also survive. formaction="javascript:…" (53606) is stripped.
Please Request CVE. Credit: Finder + Reporter (adrbogacz).
Details
naughtyHref() only runs when the attribute name is in allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes (index.js ~385). Refresh URLs live in a content value of the form 0;url=…, so the gate never fires. Adding content to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta content (description, viewport).
Fix: when http-equiv is refresh (case-insensitive), parse the ; url= destination and run naughtyHref('meta', url). Drop content (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other meta content values alone.
PoC
Local sanitize-html@2.17.7. Output inspection only:
node -e '
const sanitize = require("sanitize-html");
const opts = { allowedTags: ["meta"], allowedAttributes: { meta: ["http-equiv", "content"] } };
for (const html of [
"<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=javascript:alert(1)\">",
"<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=data:text/html,aaa\">",
"<form><button formaction=\"javascript:alert(1)\">x</button></form>",
]) {
console.log(html, "=>", sanitize(html, html.includes("meta") ? opts : { allowedTags: ["form","button"], allowedAttributes: { button: ["formaction"] } }));
}
'Expected: refresh javascript: / data: remain; 53606 formaction is removed. Do not attach a browser hang or stored-XSS page.
Impact
An integrator who allowed meta + content expecting allowedSchemes to apply (the 53606 configuration pattern) still emits a refresh to javascript:, data:, or an attacker https: URL. Stored XSS / open redirect for viewers of that HTML. Default config is not affected.
Is GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected sanitize-html, and gives you the command that fixes it.
References
- Linkgithub.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j
- Linkgithub.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce
- Linkgithub.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350
- Packagegithub.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe
- Linkgithub.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/sanitize-html@2.18.0
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.