HighGHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5CVE-2026-69247PYSEC-2026-3552

cryptography: PKCS#7 EnvelopedData decryption exposes a Bleichenbacher oracle through distinguishable errors and timing

Published 3 Aug 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026

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Affected package

Affected
>=44.0.0 <50.0.0
Fixed in
50.0.0
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:pip install 'cryptography>=50.0.0'

Details

Summary

pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation. The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the content-encryption key.

Introduced in 44.0.0. Fixed in 50.0.0.

Details

Decryption ran as: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of encryptedKey → build an AES cipher from the result → AES-CBC decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Each stage failed differently, with no RFC 3218 mitigation:

1. invalid RSA padding → Decryption failed 2. valid padding, bad key length → Invalid key size (N) for AES., disclosing N 3. correct length, wrong key → Invalid padding bytes. 4. the real key → plaintext

Case 1 is reachable only where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. On OpenSSL 3.2+, used in our wheels, invalid padding instead returns a synthetic plaintext of pseudorandom length, so the error channel does not distinguish conforming ciphertexts.

Exploitation requires a service that auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME gateway or mail filter.

Fix

Per RFC 3218, the content-encryption algorithm is now resolved before the private key is used, so the expected key length is known in advance. If the RSA decryption fails or recovers a key of the wrong length, a random key of the expected length is substituted and decryption continues down an identical path. All failures now report identically and perform the same work.

Not addressed by this fix

EnvelopedData does not authenticate its content. Tampering with encryptedContent alone yields a CBC padding oracle that recovers plaintext at roughly 256 queries per byte, without recovering any key, on every backend. This is a property of PKCS#7 rather than of this implementation, cannot be fixed in the library, and is now documented.

Credit

Reported by @X1AOxiang.

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References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.