Echo vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via unsanitized JSONP callback in Context.JSONP / Context.JSONPBlob
Published 28 Oct 2026 · Updated 5 Nov 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- <5.4.0
- Fixed in
- 5.4.0
go get github.com/labstack/echo/v5@v5.4.0- Affected
- <4.16.0
- Fixed in
- 4.16.0
go get github.com/labstack/echo/v4@v4.16.0Details
Summary
The Context.JSONP, Context.JSONPBlob, and internal jsonPBlob helper in context.go directly concatenate the caller-supplied callback parameter into a JavaScript response without any validation, escaping, or allow-listing.
This creates a high-impact reflected XSS that can be triggered by any route passing attacker-controlled data (query string, form, header, path param, etc.) into the callback.
Present in current master and v5.1.0 (latest release).
Vulnerable Code (verbatim)
func (c *Context) jsonPBlob(code int, callback string, i any) (err error) {
c.writeContentType(MIMEApplicationJavaScriptCharsetUTF8)
c.response.WriteHeader(code)
if _, err = c.response.Write([]byte(callback + "(")); err != nil {
return
}
if err = c.echo.JSONSerializer.Serialize(c, i, ""); err != nil {
return
}
if _, err = c.response.Write([]byte(");")); err != nil {
return
}
return
}
func (c *Context) JSONP(code int, callback string, i any) (err error) {
return c.jsonPBlob(code, callback, i)
}
func (c *Context) JSONPBlob(code int, callback string, b []byte) (err error) {
c.writeContentType(MIMEApplicationJavaScriptCharsetUTF8)
c.response.WriteHeader(code)
if _, err = c.response.Write([]byte(callback + "(")); err != nil {
return
}
if _, err = c.response.Write(b); err != nil {
return
}
_, err = c.response.Write([]byte(");"))
return
}No sanitization is performed on the callback string.
Exploit (one-request repro)
Any route using the official pattern is vulnerable:
Goe.GET("/api", func(c echo.Context) error {
return c.JSONP(200, c.QueryParam("callback"), map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
})Attacker request:
GET /api?callback=alert(document.domain)%2f%2f HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com
Server response:
Content-Type: application/javascript; charset=utf-8
alert(document.domain)//({"status":"ok"});→ Immediate arbitrary JavaScript execution (full reflected XSS).
Impact
- Session hijacking, cookie theft, account takeover, keylogging, defacement.
- Works even with strict CSP (response is served as application/javascript).
Affected Versions
- All versions ≤ v5.1.0 (including current master)
Workarounds
Manually sanitize the callback before calling JSONP/JSONPBlob:
Gofunc safeCallback(cb string) string {
if matched, _ := regexp.MatchString(`^[a-zA-Z0-9_.\[\]]+$`, cb); !matched {
return "callback"
}
return cb
}Or migrate away from JSONP entirely (use CORS + application/json).
References
- https://github.com/labstack/echo/blob/master/context.go
- https://echo.labstack.com/docs/cookbook/jsonp
Patches
Fixed in github.com/labstack/echo/v5 v5.4.0 and github.com/labstack/echo/v4 v4.16.0. Context.JSONP and Context.JSONPBlob accept only a callback that is empty, a JavaScript identifier or a dot-separated path of identifiers (ASCII letters, digits, _ and $); any other callback returns a 400 Bad Request error wrapping ErrInvalidJSONPCallback and nothing is written. JSONP responses also carry X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.
Workarounds
Validate the callback in your handler before calling Context.JSONP, for example against ^[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*(\.[A-Za-z_$][A-Za-z0-9_$]*)*$, and set X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff. JSONP responses can be read by any website with the user's cookies, so do not serve data that requires authentication through JSONP.
Is GHSA-h9g5-28mm-hx3g in any of your client repos?
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More advisories for github.com/labstack/echo/v5
- LowCVE-2026-118653Rate Limiter Bypass via Spoofed X-Forwarded-For Header in Default Configuration in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118650URL-encoded path bypasses route/group middleware guarding a statically-served path in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118651Reverse Proxy Forwards Attacker-Supplied X-Real-IP to Upstream by Default in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118266Echo has CSRF Protection Bypass via MethodOverride Rewriting POST to Safe Method in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118658Arbitrary Scheme Injection in WWWRedirect/NonWWWRedirect Middlewares via X-Forwarded-Proto in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-118657Echo: HTTPS Redirect and HSTS Bypass via Unconditional Trust of Forwarded Scheme Headers in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-h9g5-28mm-hx3g
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2eade87ae7e5a09d7bb5087bec271ec1
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b2f3415cf2bf5204082137b205bfd5af
- Packagegithub.com/labstack/echo
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0
- Linkgithub.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.