Omni Wireguard SideroLink potential escape
Published 24 Sept 2025 · Updated 23 Oct 2025
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Affected package
- Affected
- <0.48.0
- Fixed in
- 0.48.0
go get github.com/siderolabs/omni@v0.48.0Details
Overview
Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access.
In this setup, Omni assigns a random IPv6 address to each Talos machine from a /64 network block. Omni itself uses the fixed ::1 address within that same block.
From Omni's perspective, this is a WireGuard interface with multiple peers, where each peer corresponds to a Talos machine. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the source IP address of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Talos peer. However, it performs no validation on the packet's destination address.
The Talos end of the SideroLink connection cannot be considered a trusted environment. Workloads running on Kubernetes, especially those configured with host networking, could gain direct access to this link. Therefore, a malicious workload could theoretically send arbitrary packets over the SideroLink interface.
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Impact
This vulnerability creates two distinct attack scenarios based on Omni's IP forwarding configuration.
1. IP Forwarding Disabled (Default)
If IP forwarding is disabled, an attacker on a Talos machine can send packets over SideroLink to any listening service on Omni itself (e.g., an internal API). If Omni is running in host networking mode, any service on the host machine could also be targeted. While this is the default configuration, Omni does not enforce it.
2. IP Forwarding Enabled
If IP forwarding is enabled, an attacker on a Talos machine can communicate with other machines connected to Omni or route packets deeper into Omni's network. Although this is not the default configuration, Omni does not check for or prevent this state.
Patches
The problem has been fixed in Omni >= 0.48.0, the commit is https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/commit/a5efd816a239e6c9e5ea7c0d43c02c04504d7b60
Workarounds
Disable IP forwarding, implement strict firewall rules.
References
None
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More advisories for github.com/siderolabs/omni
- LowCVE-2026-45726Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService in github.com/siderolabs/omni · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45723Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic in github.com/siderolabs/omni · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45720Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token in github.com/siderolabs/omni · 25 Jun 2026
- HighCVE-2026-45726Omni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService · 5 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45723Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic · 5 Jun 2026
- HighCVE-2026-45720Omni has a TOCTOU race condition that allows multiple concurrent uses of a single-use SAML session token · 5 Jun 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.