Electron: Parent process code-sign check is spoofable
Published 5 Aug 2026 · Updated 5 Aug 2026
Affected packages
- Affected
- <39.8.8
- Fixed in
- 39.8.8
npm install electron@39.8.8- Affected
- >=40.0.0-alpha.1 <40.9.1
- Fixed in
- 40.9.1
npm install electron@40.9.1- Affected
- >=41.0.0-alpha.1 <41.2.1
- Fixed in
- 41.2.1
npm install electron@41.2.1- Affected
- >=42.0.0-alpha.1 <42.0.0-beta.3
- Fixed in
- 42.0.0-beta.3
npm install electron@42.0.0-beta.3Details
Impact
On macOS, the check Electron uses to confirm it was launched by a same-signed parent process could be bypassed by a local process. Apps that enable the fuse-based hardening restricting ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE and NODE_OPTIONS to same-signed parents rely on this check; a local attacker could bypass it and run their own code inside the signed app, inheriting its TCC permissions and keychain access.
Apps are only affected if they enable those macOS fuse-based restrictions. Apps that do not enable them are not affected.
Workarounds
There are no app side workarounds, you must update to a patched version of Electron.
Fixed Versions
42.0.0-beta.341.2.140.9.039.8.8
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)
Is GHSA-jm7p-cc5g-qwxx in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected electron, and gives you the command that fixes it.
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.