HighGHSA-mr74-928f-rw69CVE-2026-28492GO-2026-4585

FileBrowser has Path Traversal in Public Share Links that Exposes Files Outside Shared Directory

Published 2 Mar 2026 · Updated 23 Mar 2026

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Affected package

Affected
<2.61.0
Fixed in
2.61.0
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2@v2.61.0

Details

Summary

When a user creates a public share link for a directory, the withHashFile middleware in http/public.go (line 59) uses filepath.Dir(link.Path) to compute the BasePathFs root. This sets the filesystem root to the parent directory instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories.

Details

In http/public.go lines 52-64, the withHashFile function handles public share link requests:

basePath := link.Path    // e.g. "/documents/shared"
filePath := ""

if file.IsDir {
    basePath = filepath.Dir(basePath)  // BUG: becomes "/documents" (parent!)
    filePath = ifPath
}

d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)

When a directory at /documents/shared is shared, filepath.Dir("/documents/shared") evaluates to "/documents". The BasePathFs is then rooted at the parent directory /documents/, giving the share link access to everything under /documents/ - not just the intended /documents/shared/.

This affects both publicShareHandler (directory listing via /api/public/share/{hash}) and publicDlHandler (file download via /api/public/dl/{hash}/path).

PoC

1. Set up filebrowser with a user whose scope contains: 2. - /documents/shared/public-file.txt (intended to be shared) 3. - /documents/secrets/passwords.txt (NOT intended to be shared) 4. - /documents/private/financial.csv (NOT intended to be shared) 2. Create a public share link for the directory /documents/shared (via POST /api/share/documents/shared) 3. Access the share link: GET /api/public/share/{hash} 4. - Expected: Lists only contents of /documents/shared/ 5. - Actual: Lists contents of /documents/ (parent), revealing secrets/, private/, and shared/ directories 4. Download sibling files: GET /api/public/dl/{hash}/secrets/passwords.txt 5. - Expected: 404 or 403 (file outside share scope) 6. - Actual: 200 with file contents (sibling file downloaded successfully) Standalone Go test reproducing the exact vulnerable code path with afero.NewBasePathFs:

func TestShareScopeEscape(t *testing.T) {
    baseFs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
    afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/shared/public.txt", []byte("public"), 0644)
    afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/secrets/passwords.txt", []byte("admin:hunter2"), 0644)

    linkPath := "/documents/shared"
    basePath := filepath.Dir(linkPath) // BUG: "/documents"
    scopedFs := afero.NewBasePathFs(baseFs, basePath)

    // Sibling file is accessible through the share:
    f, err := scopedFs.Open("/secrets/passwords.txt")
    // err is nil - file accessible! Content: "admin:hunter2"
}

This test passes, confirming the vulnerability.

Impact

Unauthenticated information disclosure (CWE-200, CWE-706). Anyone with a public share link for a directory can:

  • Browse all sibling directories and files of the shared directory
  • - Download any file within the parent directory scope
  • - This works without authentication (public shares) or after providing the share password (password-protected shares)

All filebrowser v2.x installations that use directory sharing are affected.

Recommended Fix

Remove the filepath.Dir() call and use link.Path directly as the BasePathFs root:

if file.IsDir {
    // Don't change basePath - keep it as link.Path
    filePath = ifPath
}
d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)

Affected commit: e3d00d591b567a8bfe3b02e42ba586859002c77d (latest) File: http/public.go, line 59

Is GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, and gives you the command that fixes it.

More advisories for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

  • LowCVE-2026-61874File Browser: Trailing-slash directory deletion leaves public shares active for recreated paths · 13 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-55668File Browser: ScopedFs follows a dangling symlink on write, letting a scoped user create files outside their scope in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-55667File Browser: Out-of-scope file deletion by a Create-only scoped user via symlink-following RemoveAll in upload failure-cleanup in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-62685File Browser: Colliding username normalization gives two users the same home directory in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-62684File Browser: Share API exposes the password hash and bypass token in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-62843File Browser: Archive builder turns backslash filenames into path traversal (zip-slip) in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser · 22 Jul 2026
All 87 advisories for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.