arc has unauthenticated cluster node admission when `cluster.shared_secret` is unset
Published 28 Aug 2026 · Updated 2 Sept 2026
Is your project on an affected github.com/basekick-labs/arc?
Look after several Go apps? Indie watches up to 15 repos, private ones too, for $5 a month. See Indie
Affected package
- Affected
- <0.0.0-20260615160325-38402ad2ebdd
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260615160325-38402ad2ebdd
go get github.com/basekick-labs/arc@v0.0.0-20260615160325-38402ad2ebddDetails
Summary
Arc Enterprise clustering accepts cluster join requests without authentication when cluster.enabled=true but cluster.shared_secret is not configured. The coordinator validates HMAC authentication only if a shared secret is non-empty; otherwise, a network attacker who can reach the coordinator port can send a join request with attacker-controlled node addresses and role. Accepted nodes are marked healthy, registered locally or added as Raft voters, and can be selected by the
cluster router for forwarded authenticated requests.
Details
Cluster defaults include an empty shared secret and TLS disabled:
internal/config/config.go:943-950defaultscluster.enabled=false,cluster.cluster_name="arc-cluster", andcluster.coordinator_addr=":9100".internal/config/config.go:1001-1005defaultscluster.shared_secret=""andcluster.tls_enabled=false.
Startup requires a shared secret only for file replication, not for all clustering/join/routing use:
cmd/arc/main.go:1258-1265hard-fails withoutcluster.shared_secretonly whencluster.replication_enabledis true.
The join request contains attacker-supplied node identity, role, and addresses:
internal/cluster/protocol/messages.go:127-142definesJoinRequestfields includingnode_id,role,raft_addr,api_addr,coord_addr, plus optional auth fields.
The coordinator validates HMAC only when the configured shared secret is non-empty:
internal/cluster/coordinator.go:1066-1081wraps all HMAC checks inif c.cfg.SharedSecret != "" { ... }.- If the secret is empty, the join request proceeds after only the cluster-name check.
An accepted join creates a healthy node from attacker-controlled fields and adds it to cluster trust state:
internal/cluster/coordinator.go:1101-1107creates a node from request fields, sets attacker-provided coordinator/API addresses, and marks it healthy.internal/cluster/coordinator.go:1108-1129adds the attacker-providedraft_addras a Raft voter and stores node info when Raft is configured.internal/cluster/coordinator.go:1133-1138registers the node locally when Raft is not configured.
The router uses healthy nodes from this registry and forwards authenticated requests to their advertised API addresses:
internal/cluster/registry.go:263-270returns healthy writers/readers.internal/cluster/router.go:154-177routes writes to healthy writer nodes.internal/cluster/router.go:203-227routes queries to healthy readers, or writers if no readers exist.internal/cluster/router.go:327-357builds the forwarding target fromnode.APIAddressand copies all original request headers to the peer, includingAuthorizationandx-api-key.cmd/arc/main.go:1887-1897wires the cluster router into MessagePack, line protocol, TLE, and query handlers when the cluster coordinator exists.
A related lower-severity issue is that heartbeat messages are also unauthenticated:
internal/cluster/protocol/messages.go:175-180definesHeartbeatwithout HMAC fields.internal/cluster/coordinator.go:1220-1232records heartbeats and updates node state based only on suppliednode_idandstate.
Proof of concept
Safe local lab reproduction only; do not target external infrastructure.
Prerequisites:
- Enterprise clustering enabled in a lab deployment.
cluster.shared_secretintentionally left empty.- Network access to the coordinator TCP port, default
9100. - The attacker knows or guesses the cluster name; default is
arc-cluster.
Steps:
1. Start an Arc cluster node with:
[cluster] enabled = true cluster_name = "arc-cluster" coordinator_addr = ":9100" shared_secret = "" tls_enabled = false
2. Start an attacker-controlled HTTP listener that records request method, path, and headers, for example on 127.0.0.1:18080.
3. Send a framed cluster join request to the victim coordinator. The protocol uses a 4-byte big-endian length prefix, followed by a 1-byte message type (MsgJoinRequest == 1), followed by JSON. The payload should include attacker-controlled node fields and omit auth_nonce, auth_timestamp, and auth_hmac:
{
"node_id": "evil-reader-1",
"node_name": "evil-reader",
"role": "reader",
"cluster_name": "arc-cluster",
"raft_addr": "127.0.0.1:19020",
"api_addr": "127.0.0.1:18080",
"coord_addr": "127.0.0.1:19010",
"version": "lab",
"core_count": 1
}Expected vulnerable result: the coordinator accepts the join instead of rejecting it for missing authentication.
4. Trigger a forwarded operation from a node that cannot handle the operation locally. Examples depend on cluster roles:
- Join as
readerand trigger a query through a node that routes queries to readers. - Join as
writerand trigger ingestion through a non-writer node that routes writes to writers.
Expected vulnerable result: the attacker-controlled HTTP listener receives forwarded requests. Because forwardRequest copies all original headers, the listener can observe authentication headers such as bearer tokens or API keys along with request paths and bodies.
5. In a Raft-enabled lab, observe that the attacker-provided raft_addr is submitted to AddVoter, demonstrating unauthorized membership mutation.
Impact
In affected cluster deployments, an unauthenticated network attacker can become a trusted cluster node. Practical impacts include:
- Interception of forwarded authenticated HTTP requests, including
Authorizationandx-api-keyheaders. - Exposure of query bodies, ingestion data, database/measurement names, and operational metadata.
- Unauthorized cluster membership mutation, including attempted Raft voter addition when Raft is configured.
- Potential data integrity impact if the rogue node returns forged query/write responses or accepts/diverts writes.
- Potential availability impact by blackholing or delaying forwarded operations.
This is not reachable in the default standalone configuration because cluster.enabled=false, but it is a critical trust-boundary issue for Enterprise cluster deployments where clustering is enabled without a shared secret. The code already treats cluster.shared_secret as mandatory for replication, which suggests unauthenticated cluster membership should also fail closed.
Suggested fix
- Fail startup when
cluster.enabled=trueandcluster.shared_secretis empty, not only whencluster.replication_enabled=true. - Reject all trust-mutating coordinator messages when no cluster authentication is configured, including join, heartbeat/state update, forward apply, and file replication messages.
- Require HMAC or mutual TLS before processing any join/heartbeat message.
- Bind authentication to node identity and advertised addresses to reduce replay and address-substitution risks.
- Do not forward end-user
Authorization/x-api-keyheaders to a peer unless the peer identity has been authenticated and authorized. - Add tests proving unauthenticated join and heartbeat requests fail when clustering is enabled.
References / evidence
internal/config/config.go:943-950internal/config/config.go:1001-1005cmd/arc/main.go:1258-1265internal/cluster/protocol/messages.go:127-142internal/cluster/coordinator.go:1066-1081internal/cluster/coordinator.go:1101-1138internal/cluster/router.go:154-177internal/cluster/router.go:203-227internal/cluster/router.go:327-357cmd/arc/main.go:1887-1897
Is GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/basekick-labs/arc, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for github.com/basekick-labs/arc
- LowGO-2026-6907Arc has unauthenticated application log disclosure via `/api/v1/logs` in github.com/basekick-labs/arc · 5 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-55098Arc: DuckDB I/O aliases bypass database RBAC after CVE-2026-47735 in github.com/basekick-labs/arc · 5 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-55098Arc: DuckDB I/O aliases bypass database RBAC after CVE-2026-47735 · 4 Nov 2026
- LowGHSA-m3qr-fvp4-78xjArc has unauthenticated application log disclosure via `/api/v1/logs` · 3 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-47735Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks in github.com/basekick-labs/arc · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-48050Arc: Unauthenticated access to Go debug pprof endpoints leaks runtime state and enables CPU-burn DoS in github.com/basekick-labs/arc · 25 Jun 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.