MediumGHSA-ppwx-5jq7-px2wCVE-2026-23999GO-2026-4564

Fleet: Device lock PIN can be predicted if lock time is known

Published 26 Feb 2026 · Updated 9 Mar 2026

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Affected package

Affected
<4.80.1
Fixed in
4.80.1
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:go get github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4@v4.80.1

Details

Summary

Fleet generated device lock and wipe PINs using a predictable algorithm based solely on the current Unix timestamp. Because no secret key or additional entropy was used, the resulting PIN could potentially be derived if the approximate time the device was locked is known.

Impact

Fleet’s device lock and wipe commands generate a 6-digit PIN that is displayed to administrators for unlocking a device. In affected versions, this PIN was deterministically derived from the current timestamp.

An attacker with physical possession of a locked device and knowledge of the approximate time the lock command was issued could theoretically predict the correct PIN within a limited search window.

However, successful exploitation is constrained by multiple factors:

  • Physical access to the device is required.
  • The approximate lock time must be known.
  • The operating system enforces rate limiting on PIN entry attempts.
  • Attempts would need to be spread over multiple days.
  • Device wipe operations would typically complete before sufficient attempts could be made.

As a result, this issue does not allow remote exploitation, fleet-wide compromise, or bypass of Fleet authentication controls.

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds for this issue. Customers should upgrade to a patched version.

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:

Email Fleet at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com) Join #fleet in osquery Slack

Credits

Fleet thanks @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.

Is GHSA-ppwx-5jq7-px2w in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4, and gives you the command that fixes it.

More advisories for github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4

  • LowCVE-2026-54245Fleet: SQL injection in Okta conditional access endpoint allows host-controlled compromise of the Fleet database in github.com/fleetdm/fleet · 25 Aug 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-101047Fleet: Unauthenticated download of in-house iOS app binaries via predictable URLs in github.com/fleetdm/fleet · 25 Aug 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-101046Fleet: ORDER BY column injection on activity list endpoints in github.com/fleetdm/fleet · 25 Aug 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-101046Fleet: ORDER BY column injection on activity list endpoints · 20 Aug 2026
  • MediumCVE-2026-101047Fleet: Unauthenticated download of in-house iOS app binaries via predictable URLs · 20 Aug 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-48786Fleet: Observer-class users can view team enroll secrets and credential-bearing configuration via target search endpoint in github.com/fleetdm/fleet · 18 Aug 2026
All 59 advisories for github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.