OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: CPU-mismatch fallback uses 256-byte buffer with 8KB size
Published 18 May 2026 · Updated 25 Jun 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- <0.9.0
- Fixed in
- 0.9.0
go get go.opentelemetry.io/obi@v0.9.0Details
Summary
The per-CPU message-buffer fallback path uses a 256-byte backup buffer but preserves the original payload size, which can be up to 8KB. If a CPU mismatch occurs, OBI can read beyond the fallback buffer and leak adjacent memory into telemetry.
Details
https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/032473449b53d9f02ec4619d4f5b84e6a81db362/bpf/common/http_buf_size.h#L4-L7
k_kprobes_http2_buf_size is defined as 256 bytes, the size of the fallback buffer.
https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/032473449b53d9f02ec4619d4f5b84e6a81db362/bpf/common/msg_buffer.h#L12-L36
Introduces 8KB per-CPU buffer and 256-byte fallback_buf in msg_buffer_t, creating a size mismatch for fallback use.
https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/032473449b53d9f02ec4619d4f5b84e6a81db362/bpf/generictracer/k_tracer.c#L370-L394
On CPU mismatch, fallback_buf is used but size is still set to m_buf->real_size (up to 8KB) and passed downstream.
https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/032473449b53d9f02ec4619d4f5b84e6a81db362/bpf/generictracer/protocol_http.h#L412-L441
bytes_len (from m_buf->real_size) is used to read payload data from u_buf; if u_buf is the 256B fallback, this can over-read and leak memory into telemetry.
https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/032473449b53d9f02ec4619d4f5b84e6a81db362/bpf/tpinjector/tpinjector.c#L192-L206
real_size is set up to 8192 bytes and stored with cpu_id; fallback_buf only contains 256 bytes.
PoC
Local testing with an AddressSanitizer user-space PoC reproduced the same class of size-mismatch over-read as the vulnerable fallback-buffer path. That result is sufficient to ground the advisory in a fresh local reproduction even though the exact end-to-end eBPF path still depends on host BPF capabilities.
To reproduce the validated behavior locally:
1. create a struct that models fallback_buf[256] and real_size
2. populate only the 256-byte fallback buffer
3. simulate the CPU mismatch path by using the fallback buffer as the source pointer while preserving a much larger real_size
4. perform a read of real_size bytes from that 256-byte backing store under ASan
An equivalent reproducer is:
// save as /tmp/poc_msgbuf_oob.c
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
struct msg_buffer {
unsigned char fallback_buf[256];
uint16_t pos;
uint16_t real_size;
uint32_t cpu_id;
};
int main(void) {
struct msg_buffer m = {0};
unsigned char sink[8192];
memset(m.fallback_buf, 'A', sizeof(m.fallback_buf));
m.real_size = 4096;
memcpy(sink, m.fallback_buf, m.real_size);
printf("copied %u bytes from a 256-byte fallback buffer\n", m.real_size);
return 0;
}Compile and run with ASan:
cc -fsanitize=address -O1 -g -o /tmp/poc_msgbuf_oob /tmp/poc_msgbuf_oob.c ASAN_OPTIONS=abort_on_error=1 /tmp/poc_msgbuf_oob
Expected result:
AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow or stack-buffer-overflow
That user-space PoC matches the size-mismatch condition in the vulnerable code path, even though the exact end-to-end eBPF runtime path still requires host BPF attach/load capability.
Impact
This is a confidentiality issue in the HTTP tracing path. The vulnerable read occurs in OBI's local fallback-buffer handling when context propagation is enabled, the tpinjector sock_msg path is active, HTTP large-buffer capture is configured with a non-zero size, and a CPU mismatch occurs between producer and consumer contexts. Under those conditions, OBI can over-read from the fallback buffer and export unrelated memory through telemetry.
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- LowCVE-2026-45678OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Postgres BIND parsing can panic on malformed payloads in go.opentelemetry.io/obi · 25 Jun 2026
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- LowCVE-2026-45683OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Java TLS ioctl kprobe allows kernel memory disclosure in go.opentelemetry.io/obi · 25 Jun 2026
- LowCVE-2026-45680OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Unbounded BPF internal metrics replay can exhaust CPU in go.opentelemetry.io/obi · 25 Jun 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c9-g6q5-qrf9
- Advisorynvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45681
- Packagegithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation
- Linkgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/releases/tag/v0.9.0
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.