MediumGHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8CVE-2026-102945

Aether Project amf: panic on an unrecovered NGAP goroutine

Published 20 Nov 2026 · Updated 20 Nov 2026

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Affected package

Affected
<1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0
Fixed in
1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:go get github.com/omec-project/amf@v1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0

Details

Summary

HandlePathSwitchRequest guards the UESecurityCapabilities IE for presence but never for length, and the extensible APER type silently yields an empty bit string, so six unguarded index-zero reads panic on an unrecovered goroutine and terminate the AMF. The AMF is the control-plane entry point for a 5G core, so terminating it drops mobility management for every subscriber. Confirmed at HEAD daed5a2 (present in v3.1.5).

The defect

ngap/handler.go:

if uESecurityCapabilities != nil {                                                                              // line 3267, PRESENCE only
    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)   // line 3268
    ... (five more Bytes[0] reads, lines 3269-3273)
}

Six index-zero reads, all guarded only by a nil check on the containing IE. Why the bit string can be empty: the field is declared aper:"sizeExt,sizeLB:16,sizeUB:16". Because the type is EXTENSIBLE, parseBitString DISCARDS the SIZE(16) constraint when the peer sets the extension bit, and then if rawLength == 0 { return bitString, nil } returns a bit string with an empty Bytes slice and NO ERROR. So the decoder hands the handler a well-formed, error-free value whose Bytes has length zero, and the handler indexes it. The length guarantee the maintainers rely on comes from an ASN.1 SIZE constraint that the encoder rules legitimately waive on the extension path.

Verification

Proven dynamically, not by reading. Eight crafted bytes (40 00 80 00 80 00 80 00) decode cleanly through the REAL APER decoder, and the handler's exact expression then panics with "index out of range [0] with length 0". Panic discipline was checked first: the NGAP receive path has NO recover() (the only recover in the package is on SendToRan, the transmit path), so this is a genuine process kill and the AMF terminates.

Attacker model, stated conservatively: a rogue or compromised gNB on the N2 interface, which additionally needs one registered UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID. This is NOT reachable by a bare over-the-air UE; the realistic scenario is a compromised or malicious base station, the threat model N2 security exists to address.

Suggested fix

Check the length of Bytes before indexing, in all six places, and treat a short or empty bit string as a malformed IE with a PathSwitchRequestFailure rather than proceeding. More durably: since the SIZE constraint is waived on the extension path by design, no aper-decoded bit string can be assumed non-empty, so the same check is needed anywhere else a decoded bit string is indexed. Deduplicated against all eleven existing omec advisories and against hardening commit 030fe7c, which enumerated its sites and MISSED this handler.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating. The panic was reproduced by driving the real APER decoder with crafted bytes and then the handler's exact expression, and the absence of recover() on the receive path was verified by enumeration rather than assumed. The reporter separately confirmed the six unguarded index-zero reads behind a presence-only check at HEAD.

Is GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8 in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/omec-project/amf, and gives you the command that fixes it.

More advisories for github.com/omec-project/amf

  • LowCVE-2026-9300omec-project amf Vulnerable to Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer in github.com/omec-project/amf · 7 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-9299omec-project amf Vulnerable to Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer in github.com/omec-project/amf · 7 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-9301omec-project amf Vulnerable to Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer in github.com/omec-project/amf · 7 Jul 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-8779AMF Improperly Restricts Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer in github.com/omec-project/amf · 25 Jun 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-8783AMF Vulnerable to Improper Resource Shutdown or Release in github.com/omec-project/amf · 25 Jun 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-8349omec-project amf crashes when processing malformed LocationReports in github.com/omec-project/amf · 25 Jun 2026
All 19 advisories for github.com/omec-project/amf

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.