HighGHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfqCVE-2026-55677GO-2026-6293

Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files

Published 25 Aug 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026

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Affected packages

Affected
<5.2.0
Fixed in
5.2.0
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:go get github.com/labstack/echo/v5@v5.2.0
Affected
<4.15.3
Fixed in
4.15.3
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:go get github.com/labstack/echo/v4@v4.15.3
Affected
<=3.3.10
Fixed in
No fix released

Details

Summary

Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.

Details

Root cause 1 — router.go lines 798-802: The router uses req.URL.RawPath for route matching when useEscapedPathForRouting is false (the default). This means /admin%2Fsecret.txt is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the /admin/* route pattern.

if !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != "" {
    path = req.URL.RawPath
}

Root cause 2 — echo.go lines 559-568: StaticDirectoryHandler calls url.PathUnescape() on the path parameter before opening files. This converts %2F back to /, resolving admin/secret.txt on disk.

if !disablePathUnescaping {
    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)
    p = tmpPath
}
name := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")))

PoC (Screenshot)

Sample: <img width="1291" height="970" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bc58059-3e6d-4678-ab25-a5c79b006738" />

403: <img width="526" height="194" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f55ffdd-87b2-4a1b-8a13-130ebad0f257" />

Bypass with encoded slash: <img width="592" height="203" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1191cd39-ae8f-4d7e-8fb1-cb9cf31f484f" />

Impact

Unauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (/ → %2F) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.

Common affected pattern:

adminGroup := e.Group("/admin", authMiddleware)
e.StaticFS("/", os.DirFS("public"))

Is GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/labstack/echo/v5, and gives you the command that fixes it.

More advisories for github.com/labstack/echo/v5

  • LowCVE-2026-118653Rate Limiter Bypass via Spoofed X-Forwarded-For Header in Default Configuration in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-118650URL-encoded path bypasses route/group middleware guarding a statically-served path in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-118651Reverse Proxy Forwards Attacker-Supplied X-Real-IP to Upstream by Default in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-118652Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via unsanitized JSONP callback in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-118266Echo has CSRF Protection Bypass via MethodOverride Rewriting POST to Safe Method in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
  • LowCVE-2026-118658Arbitrary Scheme Injection in WWWRedirect/NonWWWRedirect Middlewares via X-Forwarded-Proto in github.com/labstack/echo · 5 Nov 2026
All 31 advisories for github.com/labstack/echo/v5

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.