Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Spring Security
Published 13 May 2022 · Updated 5 Mar 2024
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Affected packages
- Affected
- >=4.2.0.RELEASE <4.2.3.RELEASE
- Fixed in
- 4.2.3.RELEASE
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=org.springframework.security:spring-security-core -DdepVersion=4.2.3.RELEASE -DforceVersion=true- Affected
- >=5.0.0.M1 <5.0.0.M2
- Fixed in
- 5.0.0.M2
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=org.springframework.security:spring-security-core -DdepVersion=5.0.0.M2 -DforceVersion=trueDetails
An issue was discovered in Pivotal Spring Security 4.2.0.RELEASE through 4.2.2.RELEASE, and Spring Security 5.0.0.M1. When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets." Spring Security configures Jackson with global default typing enabled, which means that (through the previous exploit) arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: (1) Spring Security's Jackson support is being leveraged by invoking SecurityJackson2Modules.getModules(ClassLoader) or SecurityJackson2Modules.enableDefaultTyping(ObjectMapper); (2) Jackson is used to deserialize data that is not trusted (Spring Security does not perform deserialization using Jackson, so this is an explicit choice of the user); and (3) there is an unknown (Jackson is not blacklisting it already) "deserialization gadget" that allows code execution present on the classpath. Jackson provides a blacklisting approach to protecting against this type of attack, but Spring Security should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when Spring Security enables default typing.
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- HighCVE-2025-41248Spring Security annotation detection mechanism has authorization bypass · 16 Sept 2025
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References
- Advisorynvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-4995
- Linkgithub.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/1599
- Linkgithub.com/spring-projects/spring-security/issues/4370
- Linkgithub.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/60d459cedcf079c6106ae7da2ac562bc32dcabe1
- Linkgithub.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/6ce32ffd18facac6abdbbf559c817b47fcb622c
- Linklists.apache.org/thread.html/4641ed8616ccc2c1fbddac2c3dc9900c96387bc226eaf0232d61909b@%3Ccommits.cassandra.apache.org%3E
- Linklists.apache.org/thread.html/r42ac3e39e6265db12d9fc6ae1cd4b5fea7aed9830dc6f6d58228fed7@%3Ccommits.cassandra.apache.org%3E
- Linklists.apache.org/thread.html/rf7f87810c38dc9abf9f93989f76008f504cbf7c1a355214640b2d04c@%3Ccommits.cassandra.apache.org%3E
- Linkpivotal.io/security/cve-2017-4995
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.