Symfony has Email Header Injection via Non-Token Characters in Mime Parameter Names
Published 27 May 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
Affected packages
- Affected
- <5.4.52
- Fixed in
- 5.4.52
composer require symfony/mime:^5.4.52- Affected
- <5.4.52
- Fixed in
- 5.4.52
composer require symfony/symfony:^5.4.52- Affected
- >=6.0.0 <6.4.40
- Fixed in
- 6.4.40
composer require symfony/mime:^6.4.40- Affected
- >=7.0.0 <7.4.12
- Fixed in
- 7.4.12
composer require symfony/mime:^7.4.12- Affected
- >=8.0.0 <8.0.12
- Fixed in
- 8.0.12
composer require symfony/mime:^8.0.12- Affected
- >=6.0.0 <6.4.40
- Fixed in
- 6.4.40
composer require symfony/symfony:^6.4.40- Affected
- >=7.0.0 <7.4.12
- Fixed in
- 7.4.12
composer require symfony/symfony:^7.4.12- Affected
- >=8.0.0 <8.0.12
- Fixed in
- 8.0.12
composer require symfony/symfony:^8.0.12Details
Description
Symfony\Component\Mime\Header\ParameterizedHeader (and the related parameter handling reachable from Symfony\Component\Mime\Header\Headers) is responsible for serializing structured headers such as Content-Type and Content-Disposition, which carry key=value parameters (e.g. Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="x").
RFC 2045 / RFC 5322 require parameter *names* to be tokens: a restricted ASCII subset that excludes whitespace, CR/LF, and the tspecials set. Symfony's parameter handling validates and properly encodes parameter *values*, but does not validate parameter *names*: the supplied name is emitted verbatim into the serialized header.
A caller that derives a parameter name from untrusted input, e.g. an application that lets a user influence a Content-Disposition parameter name, can include \r\n or other non-token bytes inside the name, terminating the current header and injecting additional headers in the rendered message. This is the classic CRLF / header-injection primitive applied to the parameter-name slot.
Resolution
ParameterizedHeader now rejects parameter names that contain bytes outside the RFC token character class.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Fabian Fleischer for reporting the issue and Alexandre Daubois for fixing it.
Is GHSA-vqc8-7275-q272 in any of your client repos?
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References
- Linkgithub.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-vqc8-7275-q272
- Linkgithub.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/mime/CVE-2026-45070.yaml
- Linkgithub.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2026-45070.yaml
- Packagegithub.com/symfony/symfony
- Linksymfony.com/cve-2026-45070
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