MediumGHSA-3w93-6hmw-whh4CVE-2026-126084

Active Storage: Unsigned Content-Type in GCS direct uploads with cache_control

Published 12 Nov 2026 · Updated 12 Nov 2026

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Affected packages

Affected
>=8.1.0.beta1 <8.1.4.1
Fixed in
8.1.4.1
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:bundle update --conservative activestorage # Gemfile: '>= 8.1.4.1'
Affected
<8.0.5.2
Fixed in
8.0.5.2
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:bundle update --conservative activestorage # Gemfile: '>= 8.0.5.2'

Details

Impact

When a GCS service is configured with the cache_control option, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload signs direct-upload URLs with V4, and the V4 signature covers only the Cache-Control and Host headers. A direct-upload client can therefore send a Content-Type of its choosing, and can omit the declared Content-MD5, without invalidating the URL. GCS stores the supplied content type as object metadata, which takes precedence over the response-content-type that Active Storage sets on download URLs, so an uploaded object could be served as inline HTML under the application's bucket path on storage.googleapis.com. Script in such an object runs on the storage origin rather than the application's, but could register a Service Worker scoped to the bucket path and read or replace a victim's later responses for signed URLs in that bucket.

Applications that use the GCS service with cache_control configured and accept direct uploads are affected. GCS services without cache_control sign with V2 and are not affected.

Details

The fixed releases sign every GCS direct-upload URL with V2, which binds an empty Content-Type and the declared Content-MD5. The configured Cache-Control is still returned by headers_for_direct_upload and sent by the client, but it is no longer part of the signature, and direct-upload URLs for these services are no longer limited to V4's seven-day maximum expiry. See the Active Storage CHANGELOG.

Workarounds

Removing the cache_control option from the GCS service configuration makes Active Storage sign direct uploads with V2.

Releases

The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:

  • 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/8d93f6a872e9550a91bf0e4fce50083a235ef3b1.patch
  • 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/ddc08ba61a8001e7402864c62e466cf732fc7614.patch

Credit

This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher thepo1es.

Is GHSA-3w93-6hmw-whh4 in any of your client repos?

Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected activestorage, and gives you the command that fixes it.

More advisories for activestorage

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  • MediumCVE-2026-126085Active Storage: Possible circumvention of file size limits in Active Storage direct uploads to Google Cloud Storage · 10 Nov 2026
  • MediumCVE-2026-126074Active Storage: Possible DoS vulnerability in Active Storage filename handling · 10 Nov 2026
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All 18 advisories for activestorage

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.