Active Storage: Possible DoS vulnerability in Active Storage filename handling
Published 10 Nov 2026 · Updated 10 Nov 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- >=8.1.0.beta1 <8.1.4.1
- Fixed in
- 8.1.4.1
bundle update --conservative activestorage # Gemfile: '>= 8.1.4.1'- Affected
- <8.0.5.2
- Fixed in
- 8.0.5.2
bundle update --conservative activestorage # Gemfile: '>= 8.0.5.2'Details
Impact
ActiveStorage::Filename#base and #extension_with_delimiter, and therefore #extension, pass the stored filename unmodified to File.basename and File.extname, which raise ArgumentError when the name contains a NUL byte. Active Storage stores the client-supplied filename verbatim, so a user who is permitted to upload an attachment could persist such a filename on databases that accept NUL bytes in string columns, such as SQLite and MySQL/MariaDB. Each subsequent request that builds a variant or preview of the blob, opens it, or renders it as an Action Text attachment then raises, possibly resulting in a persistent DoS vulnerability for the pages that display the blob until it is purged or its filename is corrected. Applications that use PostgreSQL are not affected, because PostgreSQL rejects the row.
Details
Filename#base and #extension_with_delimiter now derive from Filename#sanitized, the form that Filename#to_s and the Content-Disposition header already use. For a filename that #sanitized changes, such as one containing a NUL byte, an invalid byte sequence, a path separator or another replaced character, the base and extension now agree with #to_s; the variant format inferred from such a name may change, and an existing variant may be regenerated once. Stored filenames are not modified, and no data migration is required.
Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.
Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/60f22af88b71eae251f112d8c0237a08a8832692.patch
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/9b0d4bef2211a2c08cab2e0ea17fa1d0efd5d47a.patch
Credit
This issue was found by the Anthropic OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-UQM5Z4YL).
Is GHSA-p2pm-g2h6-7j5j in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected activestorage, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for activestorage
- CriticalCVE-2026-122006Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file write and read in image analysis · 12 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-126084Active Storage: Unsigned Content-Type in GCS direct uploads with cache_control · 12 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-126188Active Storage: Possible local file disclosure in video previews and analysis · 12 Nov 2026
- HighCVE-2026-126186Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file read and remote code execution in video previews, analysis and image processing · 10 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-126085Active Storage: Possible circumvention of file size limits in Active Storage direct uploads to Google Cloud Storage · 10 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-126071Active Storage: Possible DoS vulnerability in Active Storage proxy mode via storage errors during streaming · 10 Nov 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-p2pm-g2h6-7j5j
- Linkgithub.com/rails/rails/commit/60f22af88b71eae251f112d8c0237a08a8832692
- Linkgithub.com/rails/rails/commit/9b0d4bef2211a2c08cab2e0ea17fa1d0efd5d47a
- Packagegithub.com/rails/rails
- Linkgithub.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.0.5.2
- Linkgithub.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.1.4.1
- Linkgithub.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/activestorage/GHSA-p2pm-g2h6-7j5j.yml
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.