chi Middleware Vulnerable to Potential IP Spoofing via `X-Forwarded-For` Header in `Request.RemoteAddr` Resolution
Published 25 Jun 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- >=0.9.0 <=1.5.5
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=2.1.1
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=3.3.5
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=4.1.3
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <5.3.0
- Fixed in
- 5.3.0
go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware@v5.3.0Details
Summary
The vulnerability allows the Request.RemoteAddr to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the X-Forwarded-For header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.
Details
Currently, the RealIP() implementation splits the X-Forwarded-For header by , and uses the first IP.
https://github.com/go-chi/chi/blob/v5.1.0/middleware/realip.go#L50-L54
However, relying on the first IP in the X-Forwarded-For header is insecure because it can be manipulated by attackers to falsify the source IP.
Malicious Case:
1. A malicious client sends a request with a forged IP in the X-Forwarded-For header: X-Forwarded-For: <forged-ip>
2. The proxy appends the actual client’s IP and forwards the request: X-Forwarded-For: <forged-ip>,<client-ip>
3. If the server always uses the first IP, it becomes vulnerable to IP spoofing.
Ideally, the implementation should verify IPs starting from the end of the X-Forwarded-For header value, skipping trusted IPs within the system, and using the first untrusted IP as the actual client IP.
For example, the labstack/echo web framework processes the X-Forwarded-For header by checking IPs from the end, skipping trusted IPs, and using the first untrusted IP as the client's ip.
https://github.com/labstack/echo/blob/v4.13.2/ip.go#L261-L273
PoC
1. Run the Go application with the following code:
package main
import (
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
// Set handler to print the remote address
handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Fprintln(
w,
fmt.Sprintf("remote addr: %s (want 192.0.2.1)", r.RemoteAddr),
)
})
// Use RealIP middleware
log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":8080", middleware.RealIP(handler)))
}2. Send a request to the server using curl with a manipulated X-Forwarded-For header:
$ curl localhost:8080 -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 192.0.2.2, 192.0.2.1' remote addr: 192.0.2.2 (want 192.0.2.1)
Impact
This vulnerability can lead to a request source IP spoofing issue, which may allow attackers to bypass access controls or falsify request logs. It primarily affects systems that rely on X-Forwarded-For to determine the actual client IP, particularly in scenarios where intermediary proxies or load balancers are involved.
Is GHSA-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf in any of your client repos?
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More advisories for github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware
- HighCVE-2026-72816chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header · 25 Jun 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.