CriticalGHSA-c4c3-7fpv-j4q5CVE-2026-75595

Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext

Published 8 Sept 2026 · Updated 8 Sept 2026

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Affected packages

Affected
>=4.2.0.Final <4.2.17.Final
Fixed in
4.2.17.Final
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-handler -DdepVersion=4.2.17.Final -DforceVersion=true
Affected
<4.1.137.Final
Fixed in
4.1.137.Final
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-handler -DdepVersion=4.1.137.Final -DforceVersion=true

Details

Summary

A fragmented TLS ClientHello whose handshake header spans multiple records makes Netty silently fall back to the default SslContext; where per-SNI selection is the sole mTLS gate, an unauthenticated attacker can bypass the route's mTLS requirement.

Details

In io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode the guard that should wait for the 4-byte handshake header checks the wrong offset - it ignores the 5-byte record header that precedes it - and therefore never fires:

if (handshakeLength == -1) {
    if (readerIndex + 4 > endOffset) {
        // Need more data to read HandshakeType and handshakeLength (4 bytes)
        return;
    }

When the first record's payload is < 4 bytes, handshakeLength = in.getUnsignedMedium(readerIndex + SslUtils.SSL_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + 1); leads to IndexOutOfBoundsException . That is caught by the generic catch (Exception) block, which calls select(ctx, null) - this is the default SslContext. Fallback to default on parse failure is a problem when per-SNI selection is the sole mTLS gate.

Impact

SNI routing bypass. Escalates to an unauthenticated mTLS bypass only when:

  • mTLS is enforced solely via per-SNI SslContext (clientAuth=REQUIRE)
  • the default/fallback SslContext is permissive (clientAuth=NONE/OPTIONAL)
  • no secondary peer-certificate verification exists at the application layer.

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More advisories for io.netty:netty-handler

  • MediumCVE-2026-75596Netty: Fragmented ClientHello records trigger quadratic pre-handshake reassembly in default SNI parsing · 8 Sept 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-50010Netty: Wrapping plain trust manager silently disables hostname verification · 15 Jun 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-45416Netty: SNI handler pre-allocates up to 16 MiB from nine attacker bytes · 8 Jun 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-44249Netty has an IPv6 Subnet Filter Bypass via Incorrect Comparator Masking · 8 Jun 2026
  • HighCVE-2025-24970SslHandler doesn't correctly validate packets which can lead to native crash when using native SSLEngine · 10 Feb 2025
  • MediumCVE-2023-34462netty-handler SniHandler 16MB allocation · 20 Jun 2023
All 12 advisories for io.netty:netty-handler

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.