MediumGHSA-fccg-mwvh-qqg4CVE-2026-75596

Netty: Fragmented ClientHello records trigger quadratic pre-handshake reassembly in default SNI parsing

Published 8 Sept 2026 · Updated 8 Sept 2026

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Affected packages

Affected
>=4.2.0.Final <4.2.17.Final
Fixed in
4.2.17.Final
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-handler -DdepVersion=4.2.17.Final -DforceVersion=true
Affected
<4.1.137.Final
Fixed in
4.1.137.Final
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-handler -DdepVersion=4.1.137.Final -DforceVersion=true

Details

Summary

Netty's default SNI entrypoint reparses and recopies previously received ClientHello fragments on every additional TLS handshake record. A remote peer can send a small first record that advertises a large ClientHello length and then drip the body in many tiny records, causing superlinear (quadratic) CPU work before the handshake completes. With 4095 one-byte fragments, the handler recopies 8,386,560 bytes from only 24,579 bytes on the wire — a 341× amplification ratio.

Affected Entrypoints

  • io.netty.handler.ssl.SniHandler — default constructors
  • io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler — pre-handshake ClientHello aggregation path

Vulnerable Code Locations

  • handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SniHandler.java:85
  • handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SslClientHelloHandler.java:75 (decode entry)
  • handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SslClientHelloHandler.java:165 (handshakeBuffer.clear)
  • handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SslClientHelloHandler.java:174 (writeBytes re-copy)
  • codec-base/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/ByteToMessageDecoder.java:294 (cumulation retention)

Exploit Path

1. TCP connection → SniHandler → SslClientHelloHandler.decode
2. First record: TLS handshake header declaring large ClientHello length (e.g., 4096 bytes)
3. Attacker sends thousands of tiny follow-on handshake records (1 byte each)
4. On each fragment: handshakeBuffer.clear() + writeBytes() re-copies ALL accumulated body bytes
5. Total bytes copied = n*(n+1)/2 where n = number of body bytes → quadratic
6. Event-loop CPU exhausted before SslHandler takes over

Impact

  • Vulnerability Type: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
  • An unauthenticated network attacker can drive disproportionate CPU consumption on the Netty event loop
  • Affects all Netty deployments using SniHandler for TLS termination (the default SNI path)
  • No privileges, user interaction, or special configuration required
  • Can degrade or stall TLS connection handling for all clients on the affected event loop
  • The attack requires only modest bandwidth (~25 KB) to trigger significant CPU work

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Credits

Found by a security research team from the University of Sydney, focusing on detecting open source software vulnerabilities. Liyi Zhou: https://lzhou1110.github.io/ Ziyue Wang: https://zyy0530.github.io/ Strick: https://str1ckl4nd.github.io/ Maurice: https://maurice.busystar.org/ Chenchen Yu: https://7thparkk.github.io/

Is GHSA-fccg-mwvh-qqg4 in any of your client repos?

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More advisories for io.netty:netty-handler

  • CriticalCVE-2026-75595Netty: SNI Routing Bypass via Fragmented TLS ClientHello Causing Fallback to Default SslContext · 8 Sept 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-50010Netty: Wrapping plain trust manager silently disables hostname verification · 15 Jun 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-45416Netty: SNI handler pre-allocates up to 16 MiB from nine attacker bytes · 8 Jun 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-44249Netty has an IPv6 Subnet Filter Bypass via Incorrect Comparator Masking · 8 Jun 2026
  • HighCVE-2025-24970SslHandler doesn't correctly validate packets which can lead to native crash when using native SSLEngine · 10 Feb 2025
  • MediumCVE-2023-34462netty-handler SniHandler 16MB allocation · 20 Jun 2023
All 12 advisories for io.netty:netty-handler

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.