MediumGHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxmCVE-2026-50560

Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature

Published 15 Jun 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026

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Affected packages

Affected
>=4.2.0.Final <4.2.15.Final
Fixed in
4.2.15.Final
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http2 -DdepVersion=4.2.15.Final -DforceVersion=true
Affected
<4.1.135.Final
Fixed in
4.1.135.Final
Update to the fixed version for your release line, for example:mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http2 -DdepVersion=4.1.135.Final -DforceVersion=true

Details

Summary

Netty HTTP/2 max header size handling produces attack similar to HTTP/2 Rapid Reset.

Details

There is a setting in the http2 specification called SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. According to the RFC: “This advisory setting informs a peer of the maximum field section size that the sender is prepared to accept, in units of octets.”

When a client sends that setting to Netty, it appears that Netty will behave as follows:

  • Read the request
  • Proxy the request to the origin
  • Attempt to produce a response
  • Create an exception while writing the headers for the response

Functionally, this should be similar to the http2 reset attack, but with a different on-the-wire signature.

Remediation

When speaking with clients, Netty should potentially treat this as “advisory” and ignore it. It would be best to ignore the SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE setting from clients (or ignore it when sending to clients). According to the spec, a server does not need to honor this advisory setting, and it appears that other http/2 implementations ignore it when acting as a server.

Impact

This is a DDoS attack similar to the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Attack.

Credit

Jonathan Looney (Engineering, Netflix)

Contact

Ashley Tolbert (Security, Netflix) - artolbert@netflix.com

Is GHSA-563q-j3cm-6jxm in any of your client repos?

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More advisories for io.netty:netty-codec-http2

  • HighCVE-2026-56819Netty: HTTP/2 decompression leaks ByteBuf reference count when the decompressor channel is already closed (Direct memory leak / OOM DoS) · 31 Jul 2026
  • MediumCVE-2026-59900Netty: [codec-http2] Lack of Host Header Deduplication in HTTP/2→HTTP/1.x Translation Leads to Request Routing Bypass · 22 Jul 2026
  • MediumCVE-2026-48043netty-codec-http2: ByteBuf Reference-Count Leak in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener Leads to Memory Exhaustion · 11 Jun 2026
  • MediumCVE-2026-47244Netty HTTP/2: Advertised MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS are not enforced · 8 Jun 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-42587Netty: HttpContentDecompressor maxAllocation bypass when Content-Encoding set to br/zstd/snappy leads to decompression bomb DoS · 7 May 2026
  • HighCVE-2026-33871Netty HTTP/2 CONTINUATION Frame Flood DoS via Zero-Byte Frame Bypass · 26 Mar 2026
All 11 advisories for io.netty:netty-codec-http2

References

Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.