Netty HTTP/2: Advertised MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS are not enforced
Published 8 Jun 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected packages
- Affected
- >=4.2.0.Final <4.2.15.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.2.15.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http2 -DdepVersion=4.2.15.Final -DforceVersion=true- Affected
- <4.1.135.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.1.135.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http2 -DdepVersion=4.1.135.Final -DforceVersion=trueDetails
Impact
DefaultHttp2Connection.DefaultEndpoint initialises maxActiveStreams/maxStreams to Integer.MAX_VALUE, and Http2Settings never inserts SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS by default (Http2Settings.java:305-307 only clamps a user-supplied value). Unless the application explicitly calls initialSettings().maxConcurrentStreams(n), a Netty HTTP/2 server advertises no limit and enforces none locally. Each open stream allocates a DefaultStream object, PropertyMap slots, flow-controller state and IntObjectHashMap entry; with ~2^30 permissible odd stream IDs a single TCP connection can create hundreds of thousands of long-lived stream objects. This is also the precondition for CVE-2023-44487-style Rapid-Reset amplification, where the absence of a low concurrent cap multiplies backend work.
Resources
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7540.html#section-6.5.2
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More advisories for io.netty:netty-codec-http2
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- MediumCVE-2026-59900Netty: [codec-http2] Lack of Host Header Deduplication in HTTP/2→HTTP/1.x Translation Leads to Request Routing Bypass · 22 Jul 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-50560Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature · 15 Jun 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-48043netty-codec-http2: ByteBuf Reference-Count Leak in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener Leads to Memory Exhaustion · 11 Jun 2026
- HighCVE-2026-42587Netty: HttpContentDecompressor maxAllocation bypass when Content-Encoding set to br/zstd/snappy leads to decompression bomb DoS · 7 May 2026
- HighCVE-2026-33871Netty HTTP/2 CONTINUATION Frame Flood DoS via Zero-Byte Frame Bypass · 26 Mar 2026
References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.