Netty: HTTP/2 decompression leaks ByteBuf reference count when the decompressor channel is already closed (Direct memory leak / OOM DoS)
Published 31 Jul 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
Is your project on an affected io.netty:netty-codec-http2?
Look after several Java apps? Indie watches up to 15 repos, private ones too, for $5 a month. See Indie
Affected packages
- Affected
- >=4.2.0 <4.2.16.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.2.16.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http2 -DdepVersion=4.2.16.Final -DforceVersion=true- Affected
- >=4.1.0.Final <4.1.136.Final
- Fixed in
- 4.1.136.Final
mvn versions:use-dep-version -Dincludes=io.netty:netty-codec-http2 -DdepVersion=4.1.136.Final -DforceVersion=trueDetails
Summary
A remote, unauthenticated peer can leak one direct ByteBuf per HTTP/2 DATA frame in
applications that enable HTTP/2 content decompression via DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.
When a DATA frame is processed for a stream whose decompressor has already been closed,
Http2Decompressor.decompress(...) retains the frame buffer but never releases it on the error
path, so its reference count never returns to zero. Repeating this over a long-lived HTTP/2
connection exhausts direct memory and crashes the JVM with OutOfMemoryError — a denial of service.
Details
In codec-http2/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http2/DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java,
Http2Decompressor.decompress(...) does:
// around line 433 decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain());
The argument data.retain() is evaluated before writeInbound(...) executes, incrementing the
buffer's reference count (refCnt: 1 -> 2). The very first statement of
EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(...) is ensureOpen() (EmbeddedChannel.java:360), which throws
ClosedChannelException when the decompressor's internal EmbeddedChannel has already been closed.
When that happens:
- the
DATApayload has beenretain()ed but never entered the pipeline, so the decoder'sfinally { release() }never runs; - the surrounding
catch (Throwable t)block indecompress(...)(around line 451) does not release the extra reference; - the input buffer therefore can never reach refCnt 0, and its (typically direct) memory is leaked.
The decompressor channel is closed on a reachable path:
Http2Connection onStreamRemoved → Http2Decompressor.cleanup() →
EmbeddedChannel.finishAndReleaseAll()
(DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java:125-133 and 418-420).
A peer that sends DATA frames for a stream whose decompressor has already been cleaned up (e.g.
continuing to send DATA after END_STREAM / stream removal) thus leaks one direct ByteBuf per
frame.
Affected code: DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java, method Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)
— the decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain()) call (line ~433) and its catch (Throwable t)
block (line ~451), which lacks a data.release() rollback.
Suggested fix: track whether writeInbound succeeded and roll back the extra retain() only when
the data never entered the pipeline:
boolean writeSucceeded = false;
try {
decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain());
writeSucceeded = true; // pipeline now owns the release
if (endOfStream) {
decompressor.finish();
}
return 0;
} catch (Throwable t) {
if (!writeSucceeded) {
data.release(); // roll back the extra retain(); data never entered pipeline
}
if (t instanceof Http2Exception) {
throw (Http2Exception) t;
}
throw streamError(stream.id(), INTERNAL_ERROR, t, ...);
}| Case | writeSucceeded | catch action | Reason |
|------|:---:|---|---|
| ensureOpen() throws (this bug) | false | data.release() | data never entered pipeline |
| handler throws internally | true | no release | decoder finally already released |
| finish() throws | true | no release | writeInbound already succeeded |
PoC
Reproduced against the official, unmodified netty-codec-http2-4.2.15.Final.jar from Maven Central,
using real netty classes and measuring ByteBuf.refCnt() directly (the leaking logic is not mocked).
Reproduction steps:
1. Download the official artifacts and their dependencies from Maven Central (version 4.2.15.Final):
netty-common, netty-buffer, netty-transport, netty-resolver, netty-handler,
netty-codec-base, netty-codec, netty-codec-http, netty-codec-http2,
netty-codec-compression.
2. Build a real Http2Decompressor wrapping a real gzip decoder EmbeddedChannel
(ZlibCodecFactory.newZlibDecoder(ZlibWrapper.GZIP)).
3. Close the internal decompressor channel (equivalent to the end state of
cleanup() / finishAndReleaseAll()).
4. Encode a real gzip DATA payload with ZlibCodecFactory.newZlibEncoder(GZIP) (refCnt = 1).
5. Call decompress(...) on the closed channel.
6. Observe: writeInbound(...) throws ClosedChannelException at its ensureOpen() entry
(EmbeddedChannel.java:360), reached from DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java:433;
data.refCnt() is now 2.
7. Release once as the frame reader would; refCnt stays at 1 (release() returns false) → leaked.
Observed reference-count trace:
gzipData initial refCnt = 1 decompress -> data.retain() -> refCnt = 2 (retain applied, never rolled back) caller releases once -> refCnt = 1 (release() returns false; not deallocated) => buffer never reaches 0 -> direct memory leaked
Observed exception stack (confirms the leak point):
java.nio.channels.ClosedChannelException
at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.checkOpen(EmbeddedChannel.java:959)
at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.ensureOpen(EmbeddedChannel.java:979)
at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(EmbeddedChannel.java:360)
at io.netty.handler.codec.http2.DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener$Http2Decompressor
.decompress(DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java:433)Two notes on the harness (they do not affect the leak mechanism):
- The internal channel is closed directly via
close()rather than throughcleanup(). The end state is identical (channel closed →writeInboundthrows atensureOpen()); the bug depends on "channel closed → retain not rolled back", not on *how* the channel was closed. - In the isolated harness the rethrown
StreamException's root cause shows asNullPointerExceptionbecause the harness does not initialise anHttp2LocalFlowController(a secondary exception reported during channel close). The leak is already sealed at theClosedChannelExceptionthrown bywriteInbound'sensureOpen()(line 360); in a real server with the flow controller initialised, the triggering exception is theClosedChannelExceptionitself.
A complete self-contained PoC (Verify02DecompressLeak.java, ~150 lines, no test framework) plus the
exact javac / java commands can be attached on request.
Impact
- Vulnerability type: uncontrolled resource consumption / memory leak (CWE-401), leading to
denial of service. Each crafted
DATAframe leaks one (typically direct/off-heap)ByteBuf. - Who is impacted: any server (or client) that enables HTTP/2 content decompression by installing
DelegatingDecompressorFrameListenerin its HTTP/2 pipeline. - Attacker requirements: remote, unauthenticated. The attacker only needs to send HTTP/2
DATAframes for a stream whose decompressor has been cleaned up (e.g. continue sendingDATAafterEND_STREAM). No special server configuration beyond decompression being enabled. - Result: sustained triggering over a long-lived connection exhausts direct memory and crashes
the JVM with
OutOfMemoryError.
Is GHSA-93wv-jw9v-4972 in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected io.netty:netty-codec-http2, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for io.netty:netty-codec-http2
- MediumCVE-2026-59900Netty: [codec-http2] Lack of Host Header Deduplication in HTTP/2→HTTP/1.x Translation Leads to Request Routing Bypass · 22 Jul 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-50560Netty susceptible to HTTP/2 Reset Attack with different on-the-wire signature · 15 Jun 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-48043netty-codec-http2: ByteBuf Reference-Count Leak in DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener Leads to Memory Exhaustion · 11 Jun 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-47244Netty HTTP/2: Advertised MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS are not enforced · 8 Jun 2026
- HighCVE-2026-42587Netty: HttpContentDecompressor maxAllocation bypass when Content-Encoding set to br/zstd/snappy leads to decompression bomb DoS · 7 May 2026
- HighCVE-2026-33871Netty HTTP/2 CONTINUATION Frame Flood DoS via Zero-Byte Frame Bypass · 26 Mar 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-93wv-jw9v-4972
- Advisorynvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56819
- Linkgithub.com/netty/netty/commit/5b68c61f37aa4a3045cba624cbea239655c9003b
- Linkgithub.com/netty/netty/commit/bb2ff68a1fb71cb4b0eb9a9e17b66c52aff680c6
- Packagegithub.com/netty/netty
- Linkgithub.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Final
- Linkgithub.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Final
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.