Loofah `allowed_uri?` does not detect `javascript:` URIs split by numeric character references without semicolons
Published 21 Jul 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- >=2.25.0 <2.25.2
- Fixed in
- 2.25.2
bundle update --conservative loofah # Gemfile: '>= 2.25.2'Details
Summary
Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? does not correctly reject javascript: or vbscript: URIs when the scheme is split by a numeric character reference that has no trailing semicolon. A browser decodes such references and resolves the URL to an executable javascript: scheme, while allowed_uri? reports it safe.
This is a bypass of the fix for GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2m, which handled numeric character references with a trailing ; (	, , ) but did not cover the forms without semicolons.
Details
allowed_uri? decodes HTML entities with CGI.unescapeHTML, which decodes numeric character references only when they carry a trailing ;. A reference without a semicolon such as : (colon) or 	 (tab) is left literal, so the scheme-detection check finds no scheme, and the method falls through to its scheme-less path and returns true.
A browser, however, decodes numeric character references even without a trailing semicolon. An encoded colon such as : becomes the : scheme separator, so javascript:alert(1) resolves to javascript:alert(1). Encoded whitespace such as 	 (tab) is decoded and then stripped from the URL, rejoining the surrounding text, so java	script:alert(1) also resolves to javascript:alert(1). In both cases the URL executes while allowed_uri? approved it as safe.
Note that Loofah's default sanitize() path is not affected, because Nokogiri decodes or entity-escapes HTML entities during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI protocol. This issue only affects callers of the public allowed_uri? string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.
Impact
Callers that validate a user-controlled URL with Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? and then render the approved value into an href or other browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). This includes applications that call allowed_uri? directly, as well as higher-level features built on top of it, such as Action Text 8.2's markdown link validation.
Mitigation
Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.2.
Credit
Responsibly reported by GitHub user @MoonFuji.
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References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.