Loofah allowed_uri? treats javascript: alert(1) as safe
Published 12 Nov 2026 · Updated 12 Nov 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- >=2.25.0 <2.25.3
- Fixed in
- 2.25.3
bundle update --conservative loofah # Gemfile: '>= 2.25.3'Details
Summary
Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? returns true for a javascript: or vbscript: URI whose scheme is split by a numeric character reference without a trailing semicolon, followed by a character that allowed_uri? strips, such as a space or tab. A browser ends the reference at that character and reads javascript: alert(1) as javascript: alert(1).
Details
allowed_uri? strips control characters and whitespace before it decodes numeric character references. Removing the character that ends a semicolon-less reference lets the reference run on into the following text, so : alert decodes as Ϊ (U+03AA) instead of a colon, and no scheme is detected. The same applies to decimal references and to references that encode a scheme letter, as in j\tavascript:alert(1).
Loofah's default sanitize() path is not affected, because Nokogiri decodes the entity during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI. This issue affects only callers of the public allowed_uri? string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.
Impact
Applications that validate a user-controlled URL with Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? and then render the approved value into an href or another browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting. Rails::HTML::Sanitizer.allowed_uri? re-exports the same helper.
Mitigation
Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.3.
Credit
Responsibly reported by GitHub user @manus-pi.
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References
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/pull/324
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/commit/62c04841e8252a1b5373afcd2b89fb9b8279e317
- Packagegithub.com/flavorjones/loofah
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/releases/tag/v2.25.3
- Linkgithub.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/loofah/GHSA-p9wj-w8xq-vjx6.yml
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