Loofah: CSS url() sanitization bypass via escaped parentheses
Published 12 Nov 2026 · Updated 12 Nov 2026
Is your project on an affected loofah?
Look after several Rails or Ruby apps? Indie watches up to 15 repos, private ones too, for $5 a month. See Indie
Affected package
- Affected
- <2.25.3
- Fixed in
- 2.25.3
bundle update --conservative loofah # Gemfile: '>= 2.25.3'Details
Summary
Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css rejected any property whose top-level Crass tokens included a :url or :bad_url, and left url out of the allowed CSS functions. Both checks ran only against the first parse of the style attribute. When scrub_css rebuilt each property it emitted identifiers with their CSS escapes decoded, so parentheses written as escapes — url\28 …\29 — hid the url token from the checks, and the rebuilt value was re-parsed into a live url() that nothing checked again. An escaped property name, six-digit escapes, escaped comments and escaped quotes all reached the same place.
Impact
A sanitized style attribute could make a viewer's browser issue a request to an attacker-chosen URL. list-style fetches on render with no interaction, cursor on hover. That leaks the viewer's IP address, user agent and access timing, and can reach hosts routable only from the viewer's network. No script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response, so the request itself is the whole impact.
Applications that sanitize user-supplied HTML with Loofah's default allowlist and display it to other people are affected.
Mitigation
Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.3.
Credit
Reported by NotAFlightRisk through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting.
Is GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767 in any of your client repos?
Checking one package by hand is fine. Checking it across forty client projects is not. NPMscan reads the lockfiles in every GitHub repo you pick, finds each project with an affected loofah, and gives you the command that fixes it.
More advisories for loofah
- MediumCVE-2026-126208Loofah: SVG `<textPath>` and `<mpath>` bypass local-reference restriction · 12 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-126209Loofah allowed_uri? treats javascript: alert(1) as safe · 12 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-126205Loofah: Regular expression denial of service in the SVG local-reference check · 12 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-126206Loofah allowed_uri? treats data:text/html as safe text/plain · 12 Nov 2026
- MediumCVE-2026-126203Loofah: Mutation XSS in the HTML5 scrubbers through unescaped attribute values · 12 Nov 2026
- LowCVE-2026-73492Loofah `allowed_uri?` does not detect `javascript:` URIs split by numeric character references without semicolons · 21 Jul 2026
References
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/pull/324
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/commit/b198a36e44c9c5408163ac50787825e8ca0b166b
- Packagegithub.com/flavorjones/loofah
- Linkgithub.com/flavorjones/loofah/releases/tag/v2.25.3
- Linkgithub.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/loofah/GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767.yml
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.