Loofah `allowed_uri?` does not detect `javascript:` URIs split by named whitespace character references
Published 21 Jul 2026 · Updated 10 Sept 2026
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Affected package
- Affected
- >=2.25.0 <2.25.2
- Fixed in
- 2.25.2
bundle update --conservative loofah # Gemfile: '>= 2.25.2'Details
Summary
Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? does not correctly reject javascript: URIs when the scheme is split or prefixed by the HTML5 named character references 	 (tab) or 
 (line feed).
This is a bypass of the fix for GHSA-46fp-8f5p-pf2m, which handled the equivalent numeric character references (	, , ) but did not cover the named forms.
Details
allowed_uri? decodes HTML entities with CGI.unescapeHTML, which handles numeric character references but not HTML5 named character references. Payloads like java	script:alert(1) are therefore left intact, so the method does not recognize the javascript: scheme and returns true. A browser, however, decodes 	 and 
 to tab and line feed and strips them from the URL during parsing, producing javascript:alert(1).
	 and 
 are the only relevant named character references: across the HTML5 named-character table, they are the only two that decode to characters the WHATWG URL parser strips from a URL (U+0009 and U+000A; there is no named reference for U+000D). /   decode to U+00A0, which browsers do not strip, so they aren't usable for this bypass.
Note that Loofah's default sanitize() path is not affected, because Nokogiri decodes or entity-escapes HTML entities during parsing before Loofah evaluates the URI protocol. This issue only affects callers of the public allowed_uri? string-level helper that pass it HTML-encoded strings.
Impact
Callers that validate a user-controlled URL with Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.allowed_uri? and then render the approved value into an href or other browser-interpreted URI attribute may be vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). This includes applications that call allowed_uri? directly, as well as higher-level features built on top of it, such as Action Text 8.2's markdown link validation.
Mitigation
Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.2.
Credit
Responsibly reported by GitHub user @connorshea.
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References
Advisory data from OSV.dev (opens OSV.dev in a new tab), refreshed daily.